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	 Should	there	be	lower	taxeson	patent	income?Fabian	Gaessler,*	Bronwyn	H.	Hall,†	and	Dietmar	Harhoff‡August	2019	
Abstract		A	“patent	box”	is	a	term	for	the	application	of	a	lower	corporate	tax	rate	to	the	income	derived	from	the	 ownership	 of	 patents.	 This	 tax	 subsidy	 instrument	 has	 been	 introduced	 in	 a	 number	 of	countries	 since	 2000.	 Using	 comprehensive	 data	 on	 patents	 filed	 at	 the	 European	 Patent	 Office,	including	information	on	ownership	transfers	pre‐	and	post‐grant,	we	investigate	the	impact	of	the	introduction	of	a	patent	box	on	international	patent	transfers,	on	the	choice	of	ownership	location,	and	on	invention	in	the	relevant	country.	We	find	that	the	impact	on	transfers	is	small	but	present,	especially	when	 the	 tax	 instrument	 contains	 a	development	 condition	and	 for	high	value	patents	(those	most	likely	to	have	generated	income),	but	that	invention	itself	is	not	affected.	This	calls	into	question	whether	the	patent	box	is	an	effective	instrument	for	encouraging	innovation	in	a	country,	rather	than	simply	facilitating	the	shifting	of	corporate	income	to	low	tax	jurisdictions.		
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1. Introduction	During	 the	 past	 decades,	 a	 number	 of	 countries	 have	 introduced	 a	 range	 of	 policies	 designed	 to	encourage	innovative	activity	by	firms	resident	in	the	country.	This	policy	focus	has	been	driven	by	increased	 awareness	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 innovation	 for	 economic	 growth	 and	 arguments	 that	firms	left	to	their	own	devices	would	not	invest	enough	in	innovation	from	society’s	point	of	view	(Arrow	1962;	Westmore	2013).	Among	these	policies	are	several	that	make	use	of	the	tax	system.	The	 oldest	 implicit	 subsidy	 is	 widespread	 due	 to	 being	 incorporated	 in	 standard	 accounting	practices:1	 R&D	 is	 generally	 expensed,	 which	 corresponds	 to	 accelerated	 depreciation	 given	 its	economic	life	(Hall	2005,	inter	alia).	In	addition	to	this,	a	number	of	countries	have	introduced	an	R&D	tax	credits	that	provide	a	reduction	in	the	cost	of	performing	R&D.2	Recently	 several	 countries	 have	 implemented	 special	 treatment	 for	 the	 taxation	 of	 corporate	
income	 that	 derives	 from	 the	 ownership	 of	 patents	 or,	 in	 some	 cases,	 other	 intellectual	 property	(IP).	 This	 policy	 instrument	 (often	 called	 a	 “patent	 box”	 or	 “IP	 box”)	 is	 generally	 intended	 to	encourage	 the	 location	 of	 innovative	 activity	 by	multinationals	 in	 the	 country	 that	 introduces	 it.	However,	many	economists	and	other	analysts	have	expressed	skepticism	about	 its	effectiveness,	given	the	multiple	avenues	available	to	such	companies	for	the	shifting	of	income	associated	with	intangible	 assets	 (Griffith	 et	 al.	 2014;	 Sullivan	 2015).	 The	 patent	 box	 creates	 another	 route	 for	shifting	income,	because	transferring	ownership	of	a	patent	from	one	country	to	another	that	has	a	more	favorable	tax	treatment	is	a	straightforward	and	relatively	low	cost	procedure.	In	fact,	one	of	the	 reasons	 for	 its	 introduction	 has	 been	 the	 perception	 by	 governments	 that	 income	 from	intangible	assets	of	all	kinds	is	relatively	easy	to	shift	to	low	tax	jurisdictions,	and	therefore	taxing	such	 income	at	a	 lower	rate	provides	an	 incentive	 for	 firms	 to	keep	 their	 intangible	assets	 in	 the	country.	Although	this	may	be	the	real	rationale	behind	the	introduction	of	such	a	tax	instrument,	it	is	 often	 argued	 by	 those	 proposing	 patent	 boxes	 that	 such	 a	 tax	 instrument	 is	 an	 innovation	incentive,	 as	 this	 argument	 is	 perceived	 as	 more	 defensible	 than	 a	 purely	 tax	 revenue‐based	argument.		Given	 the	widespread	use	of	R&D	 tax	 credits	 to	 incentivize	 innovative	activity,	one	may	well	 ask	whether	 the	 addition	 of	 a	 patent	 box	 is	 necessary	 or	 worthwhile.	 Clearly	 there	 are	 differences	between	subsidizing	R&D	and	subsidizing	the	income	from	patents:	the	first	is	an	ex	ante	incentive	that	targets	a	decision	variable	of	the	firm,	whereas	the	second	is	ex	post	and	will	only	be	used	when	R&D	has	been	in	some	sense	successful.	Klemens	(2016)	points	out	a	number	of	ways	in	which	an	
ex	ante	incentive	may	be	more	desirable.	These	include	fewer	incentives	for	shifting	expenses	to	the	higher	 tax	 rate	 area,	 difficulties	 in	 allocating	 income	 to	 the	 patent,	 and	 less	 distortion	 towards	incremental	 development	 that	 generates	 income	 on	 the	 whole	 product	 versus	 invention	 of	 a																																																														1	These	 include	 the	US	Generally	Accepted	Accounting	Principles	 (GAAP)	(http://www.fasb.org/home)	and	various	 International	 Accounting	 Standards	 Board	 (IASB)	 standards	 (https://www.iasplus.com/en/re‐sources/ifrsf/iasb‐ifrs‐ic/iasb).	2	For	details	on	this	tax	instrument,	see	various	publications	by	the	OECD	(http://www.oecd.org/sti/rd‐tax‐stats.htm),	and	 for	evidence	on	 its	 effectiveness,	 see	Hall	 and	Van	Reenen	 (2000)	and	Appelt	et	 al.	 (2016).	Appendix	Table	B1	indicates	which	of	the	countries	in	our	sample	currently	have	some	kind	of	R&D	tax	credit.		
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completely	new	product.	To	this	one	could	add	that	a	patent	box	provides	an	extra	incentive	for	the	kind	of	R&D	that	least	needs	encouragement:	R&D	whose	returns	are	appropriable	via	the	patent	system.	If	the	argument	for	subsidizing	R&D	and	innovative	activities	is	that	they	create	spillovers	and	public	goods	in	the	form	of	knowledge,	it	seems	odd	to	encourage	firms	to	direct	their	efforts	toward	 patentable	 inventions,	 unless	 it	 is	 thought	 that	 encouraging	 publication	 of	 an	 invention	would	enhance	spillovers	enough	to	counteract	the	quasi‐monopoly	position	the	patent	creates.		A	more	substantive	difference	between	R&D	tax	incentives	and	patent	boxes	is	that	R&D	covers	a	limited	 range	 of	 innovative	 activities	 that	 are	 more	 or	 less	 technological,	 and	 some	 successful	patented	innovations	are	likely	to	come	from	other	activities,	especially	in	the	service	sector.	On	the	other	hand,	a	limitation	of	the	patent	box	is	that	it	requires	a	patent	or	patents	and	some	desirable	innovative	activities	may	not	be	patentable.	 	A	 final	objection	 is	 that	encouraging	 firms	 to	patent	solely	in	order	to	receive	a	tax	subsidy	is	perverse	in	an	environment	where	there	may	already	be	too	many	patents,	in	the	sense	that	some	of	those	patents	would	be	found	invalid	if	challenged	(US	FTC	2016	and	references	therein).	As	Klemens	(2016)	says,	“The	patent	box	thus	gives	new	life	to	zombie	patents,”	by	which	he	means	patents	that	would	not	survive	if	challenged.3	One	of	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	patent	box	may	 induce	nonproductive	corporate	behavior	 is	 that	 it	may	encourage	firms	to	transfer	some	or	all	of	their	patents	to	jurisdictions	that	offer	favorable	tax	treatment	to	income	derived	from	patents.	In	this	paper	we	investigate	the	extent	to	which	this	has	happened	following	the	introduction	of	a	patent	box	in	several	European	countries.	We	look	closely	at	four	questions:	1. When	 a	 country	 introduces	 a	 patent	 box,	 is	 there	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 patents	transferred	 to	 that	 country?	 Is	 there	 a	 decrease	 in	 the	 number	 transferred	 out	 of	 that	country?	2. How	do	the	above	effects	change	depending	on	the	tax	rates	and	specific	provisions	of	the	patent	box?	3. Does	patentable	invention	in	a	country	increase	after	the	introduction	of	a	patent	box?	That	is,	does	this	policy	instrument	have	the	desired	effect?	4. Are	more	valuable	patents	(patents	that	are	more	likely	to	generate	income,	via	own	profits	or	licensing)	those	that	are	transferred	in	response	to	the	patent	box?		To	 examine	 these	 questions,	we	 use	 a	 new	 dataset	 created	 by	 Gaessler	 and	Harhoff	 (2018)	 that	contains	 all	 registered	 patent	 ownership	 information	 changes	 of	 patents	 granted	 or	 validated	 in	Germany	between	1981	and	2014.	Given	the	high	German	validation	and	renewal	rates,	this	dataset	effectively	 captures	 all	 transfers	 of	 granted	 European	 patents	 during	 their	 lifetime.	We	 combine	these	data	with	patent	data	 from	PATSTAT	(April	2017	edition)	and	detailed	data	on	 the	various	patent	box	measures	that	have	been	introduced	in	European	countries	during	the	past	two	decades.	We	perform	analyses	 at	 the	 aggregate	 (country)	 level	 and	 also	 at	 the	 level	 of	 individual	 patents,	where	we	use	patent	characteristics	to	examine	which	patents	are	transferred.																																																																3	Presumably	the	tax	authorities	would	not	want	to	get	into	the	business	of	challenging	patent	box	patents	for	validity.		
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Given	only	13	countries	with	patent	boxes,	with	varying	provisions	and	some	introduced	very	near	the	 end	 of	 our	 estimation	 sample,	 our	 results	 are	 in	 some	 cases	 imprecise,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	standard	errors	are	large	enough	to	render	them	insignificant,	but	not	able	to	rule	out	impacts.	We	do	have	several	fairly	robust	findings:	first,	the	patent	box	does	seem	to	reduce	transfer	of	patents	out	of	a	country	considerably,	by	about	30	per	cent.	Second,	the	main	provision	of	the	patent	box	that	matters	is	the	requirement	that	the	patented	invention	be	developed	further	in	the	country	in	which	 the	 patent	 income	 is	 to	 be	 taxed	 at	 a	 lower	 rate.	 This	 provision	 causes	 transfers	 to	 be	insignificant,	whereas	without	it,	the	difference	in	patent	income	tax	rates	between	two	countries	induces	 a	 fairly	 large	 amount	 of	 transfer.	 Third,	 if	 there	 is	 any	 impact	 on	 invention	 activities	(proxied	by	patent	filings	and	R&D	spending)	from	the	introduction	of	a	patent	box,	it	is	negative,	contradicting	the	argument	that	this	tax	instrument	represents	an	innovation	incentive.		Finally,	we	find	that	transferred	patents	are	of	relatively	greater	value	by	the	conventional	patent	metrics.	These	 results	 suggest	 that	 the	 particular	 design	 of	 the	 patent	 box	 determines	 to	what	 extent	 IP	rights	 are	 reallocated.	Requiring	 that	 further	development	of	 the	 invention	 take	place	within	 the	country	in	order	to	enjoy	the	lower	tax	rate	seems	to	mitigate	transfers	for	purely	tax	reasons.	This	finding	provides	support	for	the	incorporation	of	such	rules	into	the	OECD	Base	Erosion	and	Profit	Shifting	(BEPS)	recommendations.	The	structure	of	the	paper	is	as	follows.	The	next	section	provides	a	brief	introduction	to	the	design	of	 patent	 boxes,	 and	 Section	 3	 reviews	 the	 literature	 on	 corporate	 taxation,	 the	 patent	 box,	 and	international	 patent	 transfer.	 This	 is	 followed	by	 sections	describing	 the	 econometric	models	we	will	estimate	and	the	data	we	will	use.	The	core	of	the	paper	follows	in	three	sections	that	present	the	results	of	our	aggregate	analysis	of	patent	transfer	and	patentable	invention,	as	well	as	a	patent	level	analysis	of	transfer	choice.	The	paper	concludes	in	Section	7.	
2. Patent	box	description	In	 our	 sample	 of	 51	 countries	 (the	 list	 is	 shown	 in	 Appendix	 Table	 B1),	 there	 are	 13	 that	 have	introduced	 some	 kind	 of	 IP	 or	 patent	 box	 between	 1971	 and	 2014,	 and	 one	 (Ireland)	 that	 has	discontinued	it.4	The	potential	effectiveness	of	an	IP	or	patent	box	depends	on	its	design,	and	on	its	interaction	with	the	rest	of	the	corporate	system.	This	makes	the	analysis	of	 its	effects	somewhat	challenging,	as	the	sample	size	is	rather	small	once	all	the	design	features	are	controlled	for.5	The	important	distinctions	are	the	following:	1. Coverage	–	in	some	cases,	all	forms	of	intellectual	property	income	are	covered,	rather	than	simply	 patents.	 This	 could	 include	 software,	 copyrights,	 trademarks,	 utility	 models,	 and	
																																																													4	The	Irish	patent	box	was	discontinued	as	part	of	the	national	recovery	bill	following	the	2008	crisis.	A	new	“knowledge	box”	 that	 is	 compliant	with	OECD’s	BEPS	 (Base	Erosion	and	Profit	 Shifting)	was	 introduced	 in	2015,	after	our	sample	ends.	See	http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/	for	more	information	on	BEPS	policies.		5	Evers,	Miller	and	Spengel	(2014)	and	Alstadsæter	et	al.	(2018)	review	the	provisions	of	the	regime	for	the	13	 countries.	The	 fact	 that	 these	 reviews	do	not	 always	 agree	precisely	 as	 to	 the	details	of	 the	patent	box	indicates	how	complex	the	instrument	can	be.	
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even	trade	secrets	as	well	as	know‐how	in	a	few	cases.	There	is	also	variation	in	coverage	over	royalties	from	others’	use	of	the	firm’s	IP	and	capital	gains	from	their	sale.		2. Gross	 or	 net	 income	 –	 Belgium,	 Hungary,	 and	 Portugal	 allow	 IP‐related	 expenses	 to	 be	deducted	from	ordinary	income,	which	is	a	substantial	tax	advantage.	Most	schemes	require	these	expenses	to	be	deducted	and	the	reduced	tax	rate	applied	to	the	net	income	from	IP.	3. Existing	 IP	 –	 schemes	 vary	 in	 whether	 they	 cover	 existing	 patents	 or	 only	 those	 newly	obtained,	 in	 some	 cases	 requiring	 further	 development	 of	 the	 IP	 within	 the	 relevant	country.	4. Acquired	IP	–	similarly,	there	is	variation	in	the	coverage	of	IP	acquired	from	others,	and	in	whether	there	is	a	further	development	requirement.	Because	of	 the	 fear	 that	 the	 introduction	of	patent	boxes	would	 lead	 to	wasteful	 tax	 competition	among	countries	without	a	concomitant	increase	in	innovative	activity,	the	OECD	Base	Erosion	and	Profit	Shifting	(BEPS)	project	recommended	in	2015	that	there	be	a	local	development	requirement	for	the	patent	to	be	eligible.	BEPS	refers	to	such	a	requirement	as	a	“nexus”	requirement,	that	is,	a	requirement	 for	significant	economic	presence	 in	the	country.	 In	the	case	of	 the	 IP	or	patent	box,	this	is	interpreted	as	requiring	some	further	development	in	the	country	in	question	for	the	income	associated	with	the	patent	to	be	eligible	for	a	reduce	tax	rate.	Although	2015	is	later	than	the	period	we	 study	 here,	 several	 countries	 in	 our	 sample	 already	 had	 such	 a	 further	 development	requirement	if	income	from	the	patent	was	to	be	eligible:	Belgium,	Spain,	the	UK,	the	Netherlands,	and	Portugal.	Another	feature	of	many	tax	systems	that	will	affect	the	ability	of	multinationals	to	use	patent	boxes	to	 reduce	 their	 tax	 burden	 are	 the	 rules	 related	 to	 controlled	 foreign	 company	 (CFC)	 income	(Deloitte	 2014).	 These	 rules,	which	 are	 common	 in	 large	 developed	 economies,	 require	 that	 if	 a	foreign	company	is	50%	or	more	owned	by	a	domestic	company,	its	income	should	be	taxed	at	the	domestic	company	rate	 if	 the	 foreign	 tax	rate	 is	 less	 than	 the	domestic	 tax	rate	by	some	amount.	The	cutoff	varies	by	country,	but	it	is	usually	between	half	and	three	quarters	of	the	domestic	rate.	The	rules	surrounding	the	CFC	regimes	can	be	very	complex,	specifying	types	of	 income	affected,	ownership	rules,	etc.	Two	things	regarding	the	CFC	rules	are	worth	noting:	First,	when	a	country	has	a	CFC	regime,	the	rules	usually	produce	a	black	list	that	contains	all	of	the	“tax	havens”	in	our	sample,	 at	 the	 very	 least.	 Second,	 following	 a	 Court	 of	 Justice	 of	 the	 European	Union	 decision	 in	2006,	 these	 rules	 cannot	 be	 applied	 within	 the	 European	 Economic	 Area	 (EU	 28	 plus	 Norway,	Iceland,	and	Liechtenstein).6			 	
																																																													6	Bräutigam	et	al.	(2017)	contains	a	useful	discussion	of	how	this	impacted	the	IP	boxes.	Mutti	and	Grubert	(2009)	explain	how	an	MNC	can	mitigate	the	impact	of	the	US	CFC	rules.	
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3. Literature	review	Over	the	past	years,	a	considerable	number	of	contributions	have	studied	the	relationship	between	taxation	 and	 patents	 empirically.	 A	 smaller	 number	 have	 focused	 specifically	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 a	patent	box	on	the	location	of	patents.	Almost	none	have	examined	other	consequences	of	the	patent	box.	In	this	section	we	review	the	most	relevant	ones.7		
Corporate	taxation	and	patent	literature	The	first	group	of	papers	focuses	on	the	impact	of	corporate	taxation	systems	on	the	firm’s	choice	of	patent	system	and	filing	location.	Karkinsky	and	Riedel	(2012)	are	among	the	first	to	study	patent	filing	 behavior	 of	 multinational	 enterprises	 (MNEs)	 with	 respect	 to	 tax	 differences.	 Given	 that	patents	account	 for	a	sizable	share	of	 the	asset	value	of	a	 typical	MNE	and	that	transfers	of	 these	assets	are	difficult	for	tax	authorities	to	observe	and	monitor,	they	represent	a	major	opportunity	for	proﬁt	shifting	across	 tax	 jurisdictions.	The	results	suggest	 that	 the	corporate	 tax	rate	 impacts	patent	 applications	 ﬁled	 by	 a	multinational	 afﬁliate	 negatively.	 The	 effect	 is	 relatively	 large	 and	appears	 to	be	robust	 to	a	number	of	checks.	 In	various	specifications,	 the	results	 indicate	 that	an	increase	 in	 the	corporate	 tax	 rate	of	one	percent	 is	associated	with	a	 reduction	 in	 the	number	of	patent	applications	of	3.5	%	to	3.8%.		Boehm	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 add	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 patent	 location	 decision	 by	 studying	 the	divergence	between	inventor	(invention)	and	applicant	(ownership)	country	using	EP	patent	filings	for	 1990‐2007.	 They	 show	 that	 low‐tax	 countries	 tend	 to	 attract	 foreign‐invented	 patents	 from	high‐tax	countries,	especially	if	the	patents	are	of	“high	quality”	by	the	usual	measures.	The	effects	are	relatively	small	but	significant,	and	are	reduced	slightly	in	the	case	where	the	inventor	country	has	 implemented	 CFC	 rules.	 Note	 that	 although	 they	 distinguish	 between	 tax	 havens	 and	 other	countries	as	applicant	locations,	they	do	not	analyze	the	full	destination	choice	decision.		In	contrast,	Griffith	et	al.	(2014)	study	a	firm’s	decision	about	the	location	of	patent	ownership	and	distinguish	among	different	location	choices	by	using	a	random	coefficients	logit	model.	The	firm’s	tax	 rate	 is	 not	 only	 affected	 by	 time	 and	 target	 country,	 but	 also	 by	 its	 home	 location,	 since	Controlled	Foreign	Company	(CFC)	rules	introduce	variation	at	the	dyad	level.	The	authors	use	data	on	the	statutory	corporate	tax	rate	and	their	sample	consists	of	about	1,000	of	the	largest	patenting	firms	 at	 the	 EPO	 during	 the	 period	 1985	 to	 2005,	 covering	 about	 70%	 of	 corporate	 patent	applications.	 In	 general,	 semi‐elasticities	 are	more	 pronounced	 for	 smaller	 than	 for	 larger	 home	countries.	 In	a	simulation	exercise,	 they	 find	 that	 the	 introduction	of	a	patent	box	attracts	patent	income,	but	also	leads	to	a	net	reduction	in	tax	revenues.	
Patent	box	literature	We	now	 turn	 to	 those	papers	 that	 explicitly	 analyze	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 patent	 box	 instrument	 on	patent	location	and	transfer.	Alstadsæter	et	al.	(2018)	analyze	the	use	of	patent	box	regimes	by	the	2,000	 largest	 corporate	 R&D	 performers	 worldwide	 for	 the	 period	 2000‐2011.	 Using	 various	negative	 binomial	models	 for	 the	 number	 of	 patents	 of	 a	 particular	 technology	 type	 located	 in	 a																																																														7	 In	 Appendix	 A,	 Tables	 A1	 and	 A2	 provide	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 empirical	 studies	 that	 we	 found	 directly	relevant	to	the	study	of	patent	boxes.	
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country	 by	 each	 of	 these	 multinationals,	 they	 find	 that	 the	 tax	 advantage	 of	 a	 patent	 box	 does	induce	 firms	 to	 locate	 their	 patents	 in	 a	 country.	 However,	 interpretation	 of	 the	 regressions	 is	problematic,	since	they	include	a	dummy	for	the	presence	of	a	patent	box	and	the	highly	correlated	indicator	for	the	tax	advantage	of	such	a	box.8	While	the	authors	find	a	tax	advantage	for	the	firm	using	patent	boxes,	there	are	small	negative	effects	on	local	 invention.	However,	 if	there	is	a	local	development	 requirement,	 patent	 boxes	 seem	 to	 have	 a	 substantial	 positive	 impact	 on	 domestic	inventions	by	the	observed	firms.	Bösenberg	and	Egger	(2017)	look	at	patent	filings	and	pre‐grant	patent	transfers	as	a	function	of	all	the	 possible	 tax	 incentives	 that	 affect	 patenting.	 They	 use	 a	 country	 level	 dataset	 with	comprehensive	information	on	R&D	tax	incentives	for	106	countries	between	1996	and	2012.	The	two	main	measures	they	create	are	the	effective	marginal	R&D	cost	due	to	its	special	tax	treatment	(widely	 known	 as	 the	 “B	 index”,	Warda	2002)9	 and	 the	 effective	 average	 tax	 rate	 (EATR)	 on	 the	profit	from	R&D.		They	find	that	patent	filings	in	a	country	respond	to	EATR	but	not	to	the	B‐index	or	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 patent	 box,	 although	 the	 signs	 of	 these	 coefficients	 are	 as	 expected.	 	 Patent	trade	responds	 to	 the	EATR	 in	 the	sending	country	and	 to	 the	B‐index	 in	both	countries,	with	an	ambiguous	sign	on	the	B‐index	for	the	destination	country.10		Bradley	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 examine	 worldwide	 patent	 applications	 by	 inventors	 and	 applicants	 in	 a	country	as	a	 function	of	 the	patent	box	and	 its	associated	tax	 rate	between	1990	and	2012.	They	find	that	a	lower	patent	box	tax	rate	is	associated	with	an	increase	in	domestic	inventor	patenting,	but	not	with	the	propensity	for	inventor	and	owner	countries	to	differ.	They	also	find	that	regimes	allowing	 the	 use	 of	 acquired	 IP	 lower	 domestic	 inventor	 activity	 and	 conjecture	 that	 domestic	invention	activity	is	substituted	by	the	use	of	acquired	IP	from	other	countries.	Like	Bösenberg	 and	Egger	 (2017),	 Ciaramella	 (2017)	 studies	pre‐grant	 ownership	 changes	of	 EP	patents	 in	response	to	the	 introduction	of	 the	patent	box.	The	results	suggest	that	a	one	per	cent	increase	in	the	tax	rebate	associated	with	the	patent	box	would	induce	about	a	10	per	cent	increase	in	patent	transfers	to	that	country,	and	that	the	response	of	higher	quality	patents	would	be	even	slightly	 more	 sensitive.	 She	 also	 confirms	 that	 patent	 box	 design	 matters:	 restricting	 the	 use	 of	acquired	 and	 existing	 patents	 and	 requiring	 further	 development	 of	 the	 patented	 invention	both	discourage	patent	transfers	in	response	to	the	availability	of	a	lower	tax	rate.	Schwab	 and	Todtenhaupt	 (2018)	 look	 at	 a	 different	 consequence	 of	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 patent	box.	They	argue	 that	because	a	patent	box	 in	one	of	 the	countries	 in	which	 they	have	affiliates	 is	effectively	a	reduction	in	the	cost	of	R&D	capital	that	they	face,	it	should	increase	their	R&D	activity																																																														8	These	variables	represent	essentially	two	different	error‐ridden	indicators	of	the	same	underlying	concept.	As	predicted,	the	marginally	better	measure	enters	positively	and	the	other	negatively	(Hall,	2004).	9	Technically,	 the	B‐index	is	the	ratio	of	the	after‐tax	cost	of	R&D	to	the	after‐tax	profits	of	the	firm,	so	it	 is	equal	to	unity	when	there	is	no	special	tax	treatment	for	R&D,	and	is	less	than	one	in	the	case	of	special	R&D	treatment.	Thus	it	is	not	really	the	effective	marginal	tax	rate	on	R&D,	but	is	merely	related	to	that	tax	rate.	This	implies	that	the	expected	impact	of	the	B‐index	and	the	EATR	on	R&D	are	the	same.	A	lower	B‐index	is	expected	to	encourage	R&D,	as	does	a	lower	effective	average	tax	rate	on	the	profits	from	R&D.			10	The	regressions	show	signs	of	misspecification,	as	the	Poisson	and	negative	binomial	results	differ	greatly	in	their	coefficients.	
8		
overall.	 They	 confirm	 this	 idea	 using	 a	 panel	 of	multinational	 firms	 active	 in	 Europe	 during	 the	2000‐2012	period.	Firms	that	are	exposed	to	a	patent	box	for	one	of	their	affiliates	increase	their	patent	output	by	about	15	percent,	but	only	if	the	patent	box	is	not	subject	to	a	nexus	requirement.		Finally,	Mohnen	et	al.	(2017)	study	the	impact	of	the	Dutch	patent	box	on	R&D	person‐hours	in	the	firms	that	take	it	up.	They	use	a	differences‐in‐differences	approach	and	find	an	increase	in	R&D	in	response	 to	 the	 patent	 box,	 although	by	 their	 estimates	 the	 increase	 is	 about	 half	 of	 the	 lost	 tax	revenue.	This	makes	it	a	somewhat	less	attractive	policy	for	inducing	R&D	when	compared	to	the	approximately	unit	elasticity	estimates	for	the	R&D	tax	credit	(Hall	and	Van	Reenen,	2000).		
4. Models	A	 firm	 investing	 in	 innovation	 faces	 a	 number	 of	 decisions:	 1)	 the	 location	 choice	 for	 its	 R&D	investments,	2)	whether	to	file	for	patents	on	the	result,	3)	if	so,	the	location	of	the	first	filing,	and	4)	 the	 location	of	 ownership	of	 the	 patents.	 The	 tax	 treatment	 of	R&D	and	patents	will	 affect	 all	these	decisions	to	varying	degrees.	The	R&D	location	decision	is	 likely	to	be	most	sensitive	to	the	availability	of	skilled	personnel,	the	market	size	in	the	country,	and	possibly	the	(tax)	cost	of	doing	R&D.	 Unless	 the	 patent	 box	 has	 a	 strong	 requirement	 that	 the	 associated	 R&D	 be	 done	 in	 the	country,	this	decision	is	unlikely	to	be	driven	by	its	availability.11	Similarly,	patent	coverage	by	itself	is	driven	by	the	need	to	exclude	others	 in	 the	country	 in	question,	 the	cost	of	such	exclusion,	 the	adequacy	of	patent	enforcement	in	the	country,	the	availability	of	adequate	trade	secret	protection,	and	the	like.	Conditional	on	the	existence	of	patentable	inventions,	the	availability	of	a	patent	box	should	matter	mainly	for	the	location	of	ownership	of	the	patent	and	the	ability	to	attach	revenue	to	that	ownership.	That	is,	patenting	is	driven	by	a	set	of	considerations	that	are	fairly	orthogonal	to	the	choice	of	locus	for	patent	ownership,	with	one	exception.	The	exception	is	that	more	profitable	patents	will	be	preferred	for	transfer	to	a	lower	tax	jurisdiction.		Our	 analysis	 is	 performed	 at	 two	 levels	 of	 aggregation:	 country	 level	 and	 patent	 level.	 The	 first,	which	 aggregates	 all	 transfers	 to	 the	 sending	 country‐receiving	 country‐year	 level,	 allows	 us	 to	examine	the	impact	of	the	tax	variables	and	other	country‐level	variables	on	the	decision	to	transfer	ownership	of	patents	and	the	location	to	which	to	transfer	them.		The	second	allows	us	to	examine	the	choices	at	the	individual	patent	level,	which	means	that	we	can	include	patent	characteristics	in	our	analysis.		In	 the	aggregate	 analysis,	we	estimate	a	 count	data	model	 for	 the	number	of	patents	 transferred	from	 country	 S	 to	 country	B	 in	 year	 t	 (or	 invented	 in	 country	 S	but	 country	B	 is	 chosen	 as	 the	location	of	the	applicant):		 (# | , ) ( , )St Bt S B t St BtE transfersS B X X f X X       	.	 (1)																																																														11	However,	it	is	interesting	to	note	that	the	Dutch	innovation	box	allows	its	use	in	the	case	where	the	firm	has	obtained	an	R&D	certificate,	which	is	needed	to	use	the	R&D	tax	credit	(Bongaerts	and	Ijzerman,	2016)	report	that	 the	vast	majority	of	Dutch	 firms	using	 the	 innovation	box	 (82%)	make	use	of	 this	 feature	 rather	 than	using	income	from	a	patent.	This	fact	alone	suggests	that	patent	box	schemes	are	unlikely	to	be	as	useful	as	R&D	tax	credits	in	stimulating	R&D.		
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The	function	f(.,.),	which	is	intended	to	capture	the	relative	attractiveness	of	country	S	and	country	
B	 as	 a	 location	 for	 the	 profits	 from	 patents,	 is	 proxied	 by	 a	 range	 of	 variables	 that	 describe	 the	changing	tax	environment	in	both	countries	over	time,	as	well	as	other	country	characteristics.	We	use	 a	 gravity	 model	 of	 the	 choice,	 where	 the	 dependent	 variable	 is	 the	 number	 of	 patents	transferred	that	year	from	one	country	to	another,	controlling	for	country	and	year	fixed	effects	as	well	 as	 the	 two	 country’s	 GDP,	 population,	 R&D,	 and	 patenting	 activity.	 In	 effect	 this	 is	 a	 simple	trade	model,	applied	to	patent	trade.		The	general	form	of	a	gravity	model	is	the	following:		 k kijt i j t kit kjt ijt
k k
Y X X       	.	 (2)	In	our	case	i,	j	denote	seller	and	buyer	country	respectively	and	t	is	the	year	of	patent	transfer.	Y	is	the	number	of	patents	 transferred,	Xi	and	Xj	are	 the	characteristics	of	countries	 i	and	 j,	and	η	 is	a	disturbance,	which	may	be	heteroskedastic.	For	estimation,	and	assuming	that	the	disturbance	η	is	independent	of	the	right	hand	side	variables,	the	equation	is	transformed:	
	 exp ln ln ln ln lnijt i j t k kit k kjt ijt
k k
Y X X              		 (3)	 	or	
	 E[ | , , ] exp ln ln ln ln lnijt it jt i j t k kit k kjt
k k
Y i j X X X X             	.	 (4)		 	As	 suggested	 by	 Santos‐Silva	 and	 Teneyro	 (2006),	 this	 model	 can	 be	 estimated	 by	 pseudo‐maximum	likelihood,	that	is,	Poisson	with	robust	standard	errors.	They	show	that	this	estimator	is	preferred	 for	 gravity	 models	 in	 terms	 of	 bias	 and	 has	 the	 additional	 benefit	 that	 zeroes	 in	 the	dependent	variable	are	allowed,	which	 is	not	 true	of	 the	usual	 log	 linear	 treatment	of	 the	gravity	equation.	 See	 that	 reference	 for	 details.	 We	 use	 a	 random	 effects	 Poisson	 model	 with	 robust	standard	errors	 clustered	on	 the	buyer‐seller	 country	 combinations	 for	 estimation.	That	 is,	 there	are	 fixed	 country	 effects,	 but	 random	 effects	 for	 the	 country	 (buyer‐seller)	 combinations.	 This	model	 is	more	 robust	 to	misspecification	 than	 the	 alternative	 negative	 binomial	model,	 and	 the	standard	error	estimates	allow	for	the	overdispersion,	which	is	clearly	present.12		The	 above	 analysis	 is	 to	 some	 extent	 simply	 descriptive,	 rather	 than	 being	 derived	 from	 the	applicant’s	choice	problem.	A	more	complete	model	would	need	to	be	analyzed	at	the	firm	or	patent	level.	 At	 any	 period	 in	 time,	 the	 firm	 faces	 the	 choice	 of	 keeping	 the	 patent	 where	 it	 is	 or	transferring	 it	 to	 another	 tax	 jurisdiction.	 The	 reasons	 for	 transfer	 include	mergers/acquisitions,	asset	sales,	or	tax	considerations.	Our	focus	is	the	latter,	and	we	are	forced	to	assume	that	the	tax																																																														12	Experiments	with	the	negative	binomial	model	and	its	random	effects	version	produced	unstable	results,	supporting	the	view	that	this	distributional	assumption	was	not	justified.	
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effect	is	roughly	orthogonal	to	the	other	causes	of	transfer,	due	to	the	absence	of	accurate	data	on	these	other	causes.	An	alternative	interpretation	is	that	our	estimates	encompass	any	tax	advantage	motivations	 deriving	 from	 M&A	 activity.	 We	 address	 this	 question	 later	 when	 we	 focus	 in	 our	empirical	work	on	intra‐group	transfers	across	countries,	which	are	arguably	purely	tax	motivated.			Our	 second	empirical	model	examines	 the	 choice	of	which	patent	 to	 transfer.	 In	principle,	 a	 firm	considering	 transferring	ownership	of	a	patent	across	countries	 faces	a	multitude	of	choices,	and	would	choose	based	on	the	tax	rate	on	patent	income	in	the	home	and	potential	transfer	country,	the	transfer	cost,	and	whether	it	had	a	subsidiary	in	the	country13.	The	underlying	model	of	transfer	is	described	below	and	then	we	derive	the	(simplified)	logit	model	that	we	actually	estimated.		The	after‐tax	income	(profit)	derived	from	patent	i	held	by	entity	j	in	country	s	at	time	t	depends	on	a	set	of	value	indicators	Xi:		 (1 )( )its ts i itsX      	.	 (5)		
τts	is	the	tax	rate	on	patent	income	in	country	s	at	time	t.	If	the	patent	is	transferred	to	country	b,	we	assume	it	will	earn	after‐tax	income	as	follows:		 (1 )( )itb tb i itbX      	.	 (6)		At	 time	 t,	 the	 patent	will	 be	 transferred	 to	 country	b	 if	 the	 following	 condition	holds,	where	 the	transfer	occurs	at	a	transactions	cost	C	that	depends	on	characteristics	of	the	patent	owner	j:		  ( ) =Z    st bt i ist ibt j jX C         .		 (6)	However	the	above	condition	is	sufficient	only	if	there	is	a	single	country	b	to	which	the	patent	can	be	transferred	(this	is	related	to	the	reason	that	the	coefficients	of	W	are	not	identified	in	a	hazard	rate	or	simple	logit	model).	To	fully	describe	the	problem	in	the	case	of	several	possible	countries,	we	need	the	following	condition:		  itb itkk bMax  ,	 (6)		which	 is	 recognizable	 as	 the	 specification	 of	 a	 random	 utility	 model,	 so	 it	 can	 in	 principle	 be	estimated	by	logit	or	nested	logit	if	the	disturbances	are	assumed	to	be	extreme	value	distributed.	The	version	above	is	conditional	on	a	transfer	being	made.	To	add	the	possibility	that	no	transfer	is	made,	define	Csj	=	0	in	the	case	of	no	transfer,	and	Ckj	>0	otherwise,	rewriting	the	equation	as		 itb bj itk kjk bC Max C       	.	 (6)		
																																																													13	As	we	discuss	in	Appendix	D,	full	estimation	of	a	model	of	patent	transfer	as	a	function	of	the	characteristics	of	 the	 patent	 (X),	 of	 the	 current	 country	 (Z),	 and	 the	 potential	 countries	 to	 which	 the	 patent	 might	 be	transferred	 (W)	 proved	 difficult	 to	 impossible,	 probably	 because	 we	 have	 limited	 variability	 in	 the	 tax	variables,	especially	those	for	the	patent	box.	
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In	this	derivation,	we	assume	that	the	costs	of	the	transfer	are	determined	by	the	entity	transferring	the	patent,	whether	the	buyer	or	the	seller	actually	pay	these	costs.14	Note	that	attempting	to	model	that	for	the	disturbances	(which	will	contain	country	dummies	and	will	also	be	clustered	on	owner	characteristics).	For	estimation,	we	specify	these	costs	as	a	linear	regression	function	of	the	patent	owner	 characteristics	Z;	 the	negative	 sign	 reflects	 the	 fact	 that	 our	 indicators	 are	 expected	 to	be	associated	with	lower	costs	of	transfer:		 kj j kjC Z     .	 (6)	Transforming	equation	(9)	to	a	form	that	can	be	estimated	by	a	simple	logit	model	of	transfer	and	writing	the	costs	of	transfer	as,	we	obtain	the	following:	
	   Pr( ) PrPr (1 )its itk kjk s tk i kj itk i ts i j itsk s
transfer Max C
Max X X X Z
 
        


    
         
.	 (6)	
The	first	term	in	this	equation	is	clearly	unobservable	due	to	the	presence	of	the	disturbance,	which	varies	 across	 the	k	 possible	 transfer	 countries.	This	precludes	 identification	of	 the	 coefficients	of	characteristics	of	 the	 recipient	 countries	W.	Therefore	 the	only	 coefficients	 that	 can	be	 identified	are	those	of	the	patent	characteristics	X	and	the	owner	characteristics	Z.	We	control	as	best	we	can	for	 the	 unobservatble	maximum	across	 potential	 transfer	 countries	 using	 the	 applicant	 year	 and	country	dummies	(note	that	variation	of	the	set	of	countries	available	for	transfer	is	isomorphic	to	the	single	current	owner	country	because	we	include	a	closed	set	of	37	countries	in	our	estimation	sample).		Transfer	is	more	likely	under	the	following	conditions:		1. Higher	seller	tax	rates	(interacted	with	the	patent	value	indicators).	For	most	countries	and	years,	this	is	the	corporate	tax	rate,	while	for	countries	that	have	introduced	a	patent	box,	it	will	be	the	patent	box	rate.	For	the	government/non‐profit	sector,	the	rate	will	be	zero.		2. The	value	of	 the	patent	 in	generating	 income	 is	higher.	That	 is,	 the	value	 indicators	X	are	larger.	3. The	cost	of	making	the	transfer	is	lower,	which	we	proxy	using	the	dummies	for	the	type	of	patenting	 entity	 and	 its	 cumulative	 patent	 holdings	 (as	 an	 indicator	 of	 the	 salience	 of	patents	to	the	entity).	4. The	coefficients	of	the	value	indicators	and	the	value	indicators	interacted	with	the	tax	rate	should	be	equal	and	opposite.		All	 of	 these	 are	measurable	 for	 the	 patents	 that	 are	 actually	 transferred.	 However,	 as	 noted	 the	characteristics	W	of	the	transfer	country	(including	its	tax	rates)	are	not	defined	for	those	patents	that	are	not	transferred.	Therefore	in	the	empirical	analysis	in	Section	6	we	focus	on	the	impact	of	the	 tax	rate	 in	 the	country	 from	which	the	transfer	 is	made	(τits)	and	the	value	proxies	(X)	of	 the	patent.	
																																																													14	We	do	not	observe	the	price	at	which	the	transfer	is	made,	so	cannot	allocate	costs	between	the	parties.	
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5. Data	The	data	 for	our	study	come	from	PATSTAT	(European	Patent	Office,	April	2017	edition)	and	the	MPI	2018	patent	transfer	database	(Gaessler	and	Harhoff	2018).15		For	the	aggregate	country‐level	portion	of	the	study,	we	add	data	from	the	Penn	World	Tables	9.0	(Feenstra,	 Inklaar	and	Timmer	2015),	the	OECD	Main	Science	and	Technology	Indicators	(OECD	2018),	and	the	UNESCO	Statistics	Database.	Our	tax	information	comes	from	OECD	(2016)	as	well	as	various	prior	studies	of	the	IP	box	detailed	below.	There	are	approximately	1.2	million	registered	ownership	transfers	of	European	patents	(EP)	in	the	MPI	2018	patent	transfer	database.	About	two‐thirds	of	these	transfers	are	within	a	group	of	firms,	while	 only	 about	 12	 percent	 are	 across	 countries.	 The	most	 common	 transfers	 are	 to	 and	 from	Germany	 and	 the	 United	 States	 and	 Switzerland.	 Granted	 patents	 are	 far	 more	 likely	 to	 be	transferred	and	transferred	patents	are	uniformly	distributed	across	technology	areas.	In	contrast	to	other	studies	on	patent	transfers,	the	used	data	entails	pre‐	as	well	as	post‐grant	patent.	In	fact,	a	considerable	share	of	transfers	occurs	after	patent	grant,	when	the	rights	holder	presumably	faces	lower	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 patent’s	 validity	 and	 commercial	 value.	 For	more	 detail	 on	 the	 raw	data,	see	Gaessler	and	Harhoff	(2018).		For	the	study	here,	we	restrict	the	sample	to	transfers	among	51	countries	for	which	we	have	tax	information.	 Our	 sample	 includes	 27	 European	 countries,	 the	 US,	 Canada,	 Mexico,	 Chile,	 Israel,	Turkey,	Australia,	New	Zealand,	Japan,	Korea,	and	14	“tax	haven”	countries	or	jurisdictions,	mostly	in	 the	 Caribbean.	 It	 includes	 95	 percent	 of	 the	 international	 transfers	 in	 the	 database.16	 The	complete	country	list	is	shown	in	Appendix	Table	B1,	and	the	list	of	the	patent	box	countries	only	in	Appendix	Table	B2.		We	combine	 these	data	with	 tax	data	 from	Alstadsæter	et	al.	 (2018),	Evers	et	al.	 (2015),	and	 the	OECD	on	 corporate	 taxation	and	 the	 tax	 treatment	 for	 intangible	 assets	 including	patent	boxes.17	Figure	 1a	 shows	 the	 distribution	 of	 corporate	 tax	 rates	 during	 the	 2000‐2014	 period	 for	 the	 37	countries	which	have	corporate	taxation	(that	is,	excluding	the	14	tax	havens)	and	Figure	1b	shows	the	distribution	of	 the	wedge	between	the	rate	on	ordinary	 income	and	that	on	patent‐generated	income	for	those	countries	that	have	a	patent	box,	during	the	years	in	which	they	have	the	box.	The	median	corporate	tax	rate	is	28	percent	and	the	median	reduction	for	patents	is	around	18	percent.																																																														15	The	Max	Planck	Institute	for	Innovation	and	Competition	Patent	Transfers	Data	2018.	For	information	on	data	 access,	 see:	 https://www.ip.mpg.de/en/research/innovation‐and‐entrepreneurship‐research/data‐access.html.		16	 101,091	 transfers	out	of	106,642	over	 the	2000‐2014	period.	A	 small	 share	of	patent	 transfers	 includes	cases	 of	 co‐ownership	 with	 multiple	 origin	 and/or	 destination	 countries.	 We	 account	 for	 this	 by	 using	fractional	counts.	17	We	checked	the	coding	of	the	existing/acquired	IP	exclusions	and	the	development	conditions	attached	in	various	sources.	Determining	the	precise	definition	of	eligible	IP	turns	out	to	be	difficult,	and	there	is	some	conflict	among	the	various	research	papers.	In	addition,	given	the	ability	of	firms	to	create	local	subsidiaries,	it	is	not	clear	that	these	restrictions	bite	in	some	cases.	Unfortunately	using	more	nuanced	definitions	of	these	variables	leaves	us	with	no	degrees	of	freedom	to	identify	their	effects.			
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The	median	tax	rate	on	patent‐related	income	for	those	countries	and	years	that	have	a	patent	box	is	7	percent.		
Figure	1	
	
6. Results	
Aggregate	analysis	–	Patent	transfers	Our	initial	exploratory	analysis	is	at	the	aggregate	level.	We	observe	the	number	of	patent	transfers	from	 each	 of	 51	 countries	 to	 the	 other	 50	 countries	 (excluding	 within	 country	 transfers).	 For	estimation,	we	restrict	the	transfer	sample	to	2000‐2014,	which	is	when	most	of	the	patent	boxes	were	introduced.18	The	total	number	of	observations	in	our	data	is	therefore	38,250	=	15*50*51.19	Figures	 2	 and	 3	 show	 the	 aggregate	 EP	 patent	 transfers	 into	 and	 out	 of	 the	 countries	 that	introduced	the	patent	box	during	the	2000‐2014	period	as	a	function	of	the	number	of	years	before	and	after	its	introduction.	The	figures	also	show	the	transfers	of	EP	patents	restricted	to	be	within	a	firm	group.	Both	curves	 in	Figure	2	show	the	expected	increase	in	transfers	during	the	two	years	following	the	patent	box	introduction,	with	the	within	group	curve	increasing	somewhat	more.	The	effect	diminishes	after	2	years,	probably	because	 the	desired	 transfers	have	been	completed,	but	also	because	there	are	fewer	countries	with	a	patent	box	at	longer	lags.	There	is	also	a	hint	of	patent	box	anticipation	 three	years	prior	 to	 its	 introduction.	 It	 is	difficult	 to	get	precise	dates	 for	all	 the																																																														18	There	are	two	exceptions:	France	(1971‐)	and	Ireland	(1973‐2010,	2015‐).	As	our	transfer	data	begins	only	in	 1981,	 France	 does	 not	 contribute	 to	 identification,	 and	 for	 Ireland	 identification	 comes	 from	 the	 box	removal	 rather	 than	 introduction.	 The	 recently	 re‐introduced	 patent	 box	 in	 Ireland	 is	 outside	 our	 sample	years.		19	Two	of	the	tax	haven	jurisdictions	(Jersey	and	Aruba)	have	no	patents	to	transfer,	so	the	total	number	of	observations	is	actually	49*50*15	=	36,750.	In	addition,	France	has	a	patent	box	during	the	entire	estimation	period,	which	means	 it	will	not	contribute	 to	 identification	of	 the	patent	box	 impact	 in	 the	presence	of	 the	country	dummy.		
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countries	as	to	when	the	patent	box	first	became	a	real	probability,	but	we	do	know	that	for	the	UK,	the	legislation	was	actually	in	place	long	before	the	date	when	coverage	began	in	2013.20	Figure	 3	 shows	 that	 after	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 patent	 box,	 patent	 transfers	 out	 of	 the	 country	with	the	box	decline	significantly,	from	a	total	of	2000	to	1000	over	two	years.	This	suggests	at	least	some	success,	if	the	goal	was	to	keep	intangible	income	within	the	country.	However,	both	Figures	2	and	3	suffer	somewhat	from	truncation	due	to	the	relatively	recent	date	of	introduction	of	some	of	the	patent	boxes	(notably	that	in	the	UK).	In	what	follows,	we	estimate	models	for	patent	transfer	controlling	for	differences	across	countries	and	time.				
Figure	2	
	
																																																													20	 See	 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/corporation‐tax‐the‐patent‐box.	 This	 document,	 dated	 January	 2007,	describes	the	patent	box	to	be	introduced	in	2013.		
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Figure	3	
	As	described	 in	Section	4,	we	estimate	a	count	data	model	 for	 the	number	of	patents	 transferred	from	country	S	to	country	B	in	year	t.	We	include	a	range	of	variables	that	describe	the	changing	tax	environment	 in	 both	 countries	 over	 time,	 as	 well	 as	 some	 other	 country	 characteristics.	 The	statutory	 corporate	 tax	 rate	 of	 S	 (seller	 country)	 and	 B	 (buyer	 country)	 is	 included	 in	 most	regressions.	This	rate	excludes	any	advantage	due	to	the	patent	box.	To	model	the	patent	box,	we	used	either	a	dummy	for	its	presence,	or	the	magnitude	of	the	reduction	from	the	corporate	tax	rate	(corporate	 tax	 rate	 less	 the	 tax	 rate	 on	 income	 attributed	 to	 patents).	 The	 other	 country	characteristics	included	are	population,	real	GDP	per	capita,	EP	patent	applications	per	capita,	and	the	 R&D‐GDP	 ratio	 plus	 a	 dummy	 for	 those	 few	 observations	 where	 R&D	 spending	 was	unobtainable.	The	population	and	GDP	numbers	come	from	the	Penn	World	Tables	9.0	(Feenstra	et	al.	 2015),	while	 the	R&D	 figures	 come	 from	 the	UNESCO	 Institute	 for	 Statistics	 database	 (United	Nationals	Institute	for	Statistics	2018)	and	are	also	available	from	the	International	Monetary	Fund	statistical	database.		In	 practice	 we	 found	 that	 excluding	 the	 14	 tax	 haven	 countries	 from	 the	 sample	 made	 little	difference	to	the	estimates,	so	we	focus	here	on	the	results	that	are	based	on	the	37	country	sample,	which	 includes	 all	 13	 countries	 that	 have	 introduced	 a	 patent	 box	 by	 2014.21	 These	 results	 are	shown	in	Tables	1	and	2.	Results	for	the	51	country	sample	are	shown	in	Appendix	Tables	B3	and	B4.		
																																																													21	 The	 sample	 is	 27	 European	 countries,	 Australia,	 Canada,	 Chile,	 Israel,	 Japan,	 South	 Korea,	Mexico,	 New	Zealand,	Turkey,	and	the	US.	
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We	 parametrize	 the	 tax	 rates	 f	 in	 a	 number	 of	 ways.	 In	 all	 versions	 we	 include	 the	 nominal	corporate	tax	rate	of	the	buyer	and	seller	countries.	In	the	first	version	we	include	dummies	for	the	patent	box	in	the	buyer	and	seller	countries	in	all	the	years	when	it	was	available	(columns	1	and	5	of	Table	1).	In	the	second	we	include	the	magnitude	of	the	difference	between	the	ordinary	income	and	patent	income	tax	rates	for	both	countries	(columns	2	and	6	of	Table	1).	In	the	third	version	we	explore	 the	 timing	 of	 the	 response	 to	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 patent	 box:	 instead	 of	 including	 a	dummy	 for	 every	 year	 following	 its	 introduction,	we	 include	 dummies	 only	 for	 the	 introductory	year	and	3	lags	(columns	3,	4,	7,	and	8	of	Table	1).	The	assumption	is	that	the	introduction	of	the	patent	box	triggers	patent	transfers,	possibly	with	a	lag,	but	that	after	that	adjustment,	there	will	be	no	additional	 transfers,	because	new	patents	can	simply	be	 taken	out	with	ownership	residing	 in	the	patent	box	country.		The	 first	 four	 columns	 of	 Table	 1	 show	 the	 results	 for	 Poisson	 random	 effects	 estimation	 of	 the	number	 of	 international	 patent	 transfers	 from	 one	 country	 to	 another	 on	 the	 tax	 variables	 and	complete	sets	of	dummies	for	buyer	and	seller	countries	as	well	as	year	dummies,	while	the	next	four	 columns	 add	 the	 various	 country	 characteristics.22	 The	 country	 dummies	 already	 control	 to	some	 extent	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 average	 number	 of	 patents,	 the	 size	 of	 the	 economy	 and	 its	technological	 intensity	 vary	 enormously	 across	 countries,	 so	 adding	 these	 characteristics	 to	 the	regression	 only	 controls	 for	 their	 change	 over	 time.	 We	 found	 that	 only	 the	 buyer	 country	population	and	per	capita	patenting	entered	the	regression	significantly.	We	also	found	that	neither	of	the	general	corporate	tax	rates	entered	the	regression	significantly,	although	the	standard	errors	are	quite	large.23	Columns	1	and	2	in	Table	1	show	that	the	patent	box	has	an	insignificant	impact	on	patent	transfer	to	 the	 country,	whereas	with	 the	patent	box	has	 a	 strongly	negative	 impact	on	 transfer	 from	 the	country.		Thus	once	we	control	for	seller,	buyer,	and	year,	only	changes	in	the	potential	seller’s	tax	rates	have	any	noticeable	effect	on	the	number	of	patents	transferred,	with	the	lower	tax	rates	on	patent	box	income	in	the	seller	country	discouraging	the	transfer	of	patents.	The	coefficient	on	the	seller’s	 patent	 box	dummy	 implies	 a	 28	per	 cent	 reduction	 in	 transfers	 due	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 a	patent	box.	Because	the	average	difference	between	the	corporate	tax	rate	and	the	patent	box	rate	is	 0.18	 for	 those	 countries	 that	 have	 a	 patent	 box,	 the	 coefficient	 estimate	 of	 ‐1.52	 implies	 an	average	impact	that	is	almost	the	same,	27	per	cent.		As	Figure	2	suggests,	we	might	expect	that	the	patent	box	impact	on	patent	transfer	is	transitory,	because	 patent	 applications	 after	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 patent	 box	will	 simply	 be	made	 from	 the	relevant	 jurisdiction.	 In	 column	3	 of	 Table	 2,	 this	 idea	 is	 explored	 by	 including	 dummies	 for	 the	patent	box	only	in	years	0	through	3	following	the	patent	box	introduction.	The	results	show	that	there	may	be	a	transitory	impact	of	the	patent	box	on	transfers	to	a	country	which	is	strongest	in																																																														22	We	cluster	the	standard	errors	by	origin‐destination	country	pairs.	Our	estimation	strategy	means	that	the	average	transfer	effects	(to	and	from)	for	each	country	are	treated	as	fixed	effects,	while	the	average	transfer	effect	between	 specific	pairs	 of	 countries	 is	 treated	as	 a	 random	effect,	 conditional	 on	 each	 country’s	 own	average	transfer	probability.		23	 Identification	 is	marginal	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 country	 and	 year	 dummies,	 because	 the	within	 variance	 of	corporate	tax	rates	is	about	10	per	cent	of	the	total.		
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year	2.	That	is,	it	takes	some	time	after	the	patent	box	introduction	for	transfers	to	that	country	to	respond.	However	the	sum	of	the	4	coefficients	is	insignificant,	equal	to	0.40	with	a	standard	error	of	0.60,	once	again	too	large	to	draw	strong	conclusions.	Our	conclusion	is	that	introducing	a	patent	box	may	encourage	some	patent	transfer	into	the	country,	and	also	discourages	patent	transfer	out	of	 the	 country.	 	 We	 also	 note	 that	 the	 encouragement	 effect	 could	 be	 larger	 but	 it	 is	 less	 well‐determined	 than	 the	 discouragement	 effect.	 In	 general,	 the	 results	when	we	 include	 the	 country	variables	for	population,	GDP,	R&D,	and	patenting	are	very	similar	(columns	5	to	8).		Columns	4	and	8	of	Table	1	show	estimates	where	we	restrict	the	transfers	to	those	that	are	within	the	group,	 that	 is,	 transfers	within	a	multinational	 firm.	 In	 this	 case	 the	 results	are	quite	 similar,	with	 a	 hint	 that	 the	 impact	 on	 transfers	 out	 is	 slightly	 higher,	 whereas	 the	 impact	 on	 patent	retention	is	slightly	weaker.	However,	it	is	quite	clear	that	the	regressions	are	almost	at	the	limit	of	what	can	be	identified	from	these	data.				
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Table	1	
	In	principle	the	decision	to	transfer	IP	from	one	jurisdiction	to	another	should	depend	primarily	on	the	difference	 in	tax	rates	 in	the	 two	regimes,	rather	than	on	their	absolute	 level.	We	pursue	this	approach	 in	 Table	 2.	 Denoting	 the	 statutory	 corporate	 tax	 rate	 as	 τ	 and	 the	 tax	 rate	 on	 patent	income	as	ρ,	we	define	the	following	variables:	
	 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )S BB B S S S B S Bdifftaxdiffbox                  	 (7)	 	
All All All
Within 
group All All All
Within 
group
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Buyer corporate tax rate 0.64 0.81 1.11 0.36 ‐1.19 ‐0.99 ‐0.67 ‐1.21
(1.29) (1.28) (1.35) (1.88) (1.30) (1.28) (1.32) (1.67)
Dummy for buyer patent box ‐0.07 ‐0.17
  in all years after introduction (0.15) (0.13)
Buyer patent tax rate wedge ‐0.03 ‐0.46
  in all years after introduction (0.76) (0.67)
Dummy for buyer patent box 0.00 0.00 ‐0.07 ‐0.07
  in year of introduction (0.12) (0.16) (0.11) (0.14)
Dummy for buyer patent box 0.13 0.23 0.05 0.13
  in year after introduction (0.23) (0.27) (0.22) (0.24)
Dummy for buyer patent box 0.40* 0.63** 0.31 0.52**
  two years after introduction (0.24) (0.26) (0.23) (0.25)
Dummy for buyer patent box ‐0.11 ‐0.21 ‐0.20* ‐0.32*
  three years after introduction (0.15) (0.20) (0.12) (0.17)
Seller corporate tax rate 0.97 1.11 1.40 1.64 0.41 0.61 0.75 0.69
(1.06) (1.03) (1.00) (1.30) (1.39) (1.41) (1.41) (1.92)
Dummy for seller patent box ‐0.33** ‐0.32**
  in all years after introduction (0.13) (0.13)
Seller patent tax rate wedge ‐1.52** ‐1.36**
  in all years after introduction (0.63) (0.67)
Dummy for seller patent box 0.01 0.17 0.00 0.17
  in year of introduction (0.23) (0.28) (0.24) (0.29)
Dummy for seller patent box ‐0.32* ‐0.24 ‐0.34* ‐0.24
  in year after introduction (0.19) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19)
Dummy for seller patent box ‐0.23* ‐0.19 ‐0.22 ‐0.16
  two years after introduction (0.13) (0.22) (0.18) (0.28)
Dummy for seller patent box ‐0.21 ‐0.16 ‐0.20 ‐0.16
  three years after introduction (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16)
Chi‐squared 4157.9 4173.6 4243.1 3221.0 4309.3 4339.4 4370.2 3286.4
Chi‐sq degrees of freedom 92 92 98 98 100 100 106 106
Inter‐country patent transfer flows
Dependent variable: Number of patents transferred from seller country to buyer country  during the year
Regressions  in columns5‐8 also include the buyer and seller aggregate patent applications, population, GDP per capita, and R&D 
intensity, all  in logs.
19,980 observations  on 1,332 country pairs, 2000‐2014
Poisson random effects  panel  regression with standard errors  clustered on buyer‐seller country pairs. 
Coefficient significance is  denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
All  regressions  include complete sets  of dummies for the 37 buyer and seller countries  and years. 
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These	variables	are	defined	in	such	a	way	that	their	expected	coefficients	are	positive	(the	greater	the	seller	tax	rate	is	relative	to	the	buyer	tax	rate,	the	higher	the	likelihood	of	a	transfer).		Table	2	shows	 the	results	of	estimation	with	 these	variables,	and	additional	 results	are	shown	 in	Appendix	Table	B5.	Neither	difftax	nor	diffbox	is	significant	by	itself	in	predicting	patent	transfers.	The	 variable	 diffbox	 is	 also	 interacted	 with	 several	 other	 features	 of	 the	 tax	 system	 in	 the	regressions	 following:	 1)	whether	 existing	 patents	 are	 eligible	 (shown	 in	 Table	 B3);	 2)	whether	acquired	 patents	 are	 eligible	 (shown	 in	 Table	 B3);	 3)	 whether	 there	 is	 requirement	 of	 further	development	of	 the	 invention	 in	 the	 country;	4)	whether	CFC	 rules	apply	between	 the	 seller	and	buyer	 country.	 Measuring	 the	 impact	 of	 all	 these	 results	 is	 challenging	 due	 to	 an	 absence	 of	sufficient	 variation	 across	 countries	 (see	 Table	 A1).	 Therefore	 we	 examine	 them	 one	 at	 a	 time.	Allowing	existing	and/or	acquired	patents	to	benefit	from	the	patent	box	does	not	have	a	significant	impact	 on	 the	 number	 of	 transfers	 to	 that	 country,	 although	 the	 large	 standard	 errors	 do	 not	warrant	strong	conclusions.		In	 contrast,	 the	 requirement	 for	 further	 development	 of	 the	 patented	 invention	 in	 the	 buyer	country	substantially	reduces	transfers,	while	countries	without	that	requirement	see	an	increase	in	transfers	from	the	patent	box.	We	can	compute	the	potential	impact	of	a	change	in	the	patent	box	tax	advantage	for	systems	with	and	without	this	feature,	finding	that	the	response	to	a	10	percent	increase	in	the	tax	advantage	from	a	patent	box	is	associated	with	an	increase	of	about	14	percent	(standard	error	6	percent)	 if	 existing	and/or	acquired	patents	are	 included	and	minus	6	percent	(standard	error	10	percent)	 if	 they	are	excluded.	This	 result	 is	 consistent	with	 the	profit‐shifting	results	of	Koethenbuerger	et	al.	(2016).	CFC	requirements	imposed	on	the	buyer	country	by	the	seller	country	also	reduce	the	likelihood	of	transferring	patents,	although	if	the	gap	in	corporate	tax	rates	is	large	enough,	it	is	able	to	override	this	 impact.	The	point	at	which	the	CFC	impact	turns	positive	is	a	corporate	tax	rate	difference	of	about	11	per	cent,	so	 it	 is	well	within	our	data.	Again,	we	caution	that	the	confidence	interval	 for	this	point	is	quite	broad,	given	the	standard	errors.	Columns	4	 and	8	 in	Table	 2	 show	 the	 results	 for	within‐group	 transfers,	 as	 in	Table	 1.	 They	 are	quite	similar	to	those	for	all	the	international	transfers,	with	the	exception	of	the	CFC	rules,	which	have	a	somewhat	stronger	 impact	when	 interacted	with	 the	patent	box	differential	and	a	weaker	impact	interacted	with	the	overall	corporate	tax	differential.		
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Table	2	
	These	 results	 lead	us	 to	 two	conclusions.	Overall,	 the	presence	of	 a	patent	box	may	 induce	 some	transfers	to	the	jurisdiction,	albeit	with	a	bit	of	lag.	However,	the	most	significant	impact	of	a	patent	box	is	to	prevent	patents	from	being	transferred,	as	intended	by	the	tax	authorities.	The	results	also	show	that	 if	 a	 country’s	patent	box	does	not	 require	 further	development	of	 the	 invention	 in	 the	country,	 more	 patent	 transfer	 to	 the	 country	 will	 be	 induced.	 Along	 with	 CFC	 rules,	 the	development	 requirement	 is	 more	 important	 in	 our	 data	 than	 whether	 or	 not	 pre‐existing	 or	acquired	patents	are	included	among	the	patents	eligible	for	special	tax	treatment,	although	clearly	these	rules	are	related.		
Aggregate	analysis	–	Inventive	activity	The	 innovation	 policy	 argument	 for	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 patent	 box	 is	 that	 it	 should	 encourage	invention	and	innovative	activity	in	the	relevant	country.	In	this	section	of	the	paper	we	look	at	how	such	activity	changed	after	a	patent	box	was	introduced,	using	two	indicators	of	inventive	activity:	EP	patent	 filings	 from	 inventors	 resident	 in	 the	 country	and	 the	 level	of	business	R&D	spending.	The	 analysis	 is	 admittedly	 very	 aggregate,	 but	 still	 indicative	 of	 whether	 the	 patent	 box	 has	 an	impact	on	the	level	of	innovative	activity	in	a	country.			Because	of	patent	data	truncation	due	to	lags	in	PATSTAT	(April	2017	edition),	the	filings	in	2015	and	 2016	 are	 incomplete.	 This	 means	 that	 the	 window	 we	 can	 examine	 ends	 in	 2014	 which	
All All All
Within 
group All All All
Within 
group
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Difference:  0.18 0.35 ‐0.31 0.28 0.80 0.79 0.68 0.88
   seller corp tax‐buyer corp tax (0.88) (0.90) (0.95) (1.24) (0.98) (0.97) (0.98) (1.28)
Difference:  0.60 1.36** 0.34 0.40 0.28 0.72 0.03 0.09
   buyer‐seller patent tax wedge (0.49) (0.63) (0.56) (0.74) (0.50) (0.62) (0.57) (0.73)
D (dev condition on use)*buyer‐ ‐1.95* ‐1.04
   seller patent tax wedge (1.03) (0.94)
D (CFC rules apply to buyer) ‐0.37** ‐0.22 ‐0.37** ‐0.24
(0.17) (0.27) (0.15) (0.22)
D (CFC) * seller‐buyer corp 3.32*** 1.21 2.34* 0.65
   tax difference (1.13) (1.77) (1.36) (1.67)
D (CFC) * buyer‐seller patent  1.27 2.22* 1.37 2.26*
   box difference (1.04) (1.26) (1.02) (1.24)
Chi‐squared 4,036.6 4,052.4 4,158.6 3,056.8 4,271.7 4,295.0 4,405.3 3,538.3
Degrees of freedom 90 91 93 93 98 99 101 101
Regressions in columns  5‐8 also include the buyer and seller aggregate patent applications, population, GDP per capita, and R&D 
intensity, all  in logs.
Inter‐country patent transfer flows ‐ exploring tax variables
Dependent variable: Number of patents transferred from seller country to buyer country  during the year
Poisson random effects panel  regression with standard errors  clustered on buyer‐seller country pairs. 
19,980 observations on 1,332 country pairs, 2000‐2014
Coefficient significance is denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
All  regressions  include complete sets of dummies  for the 37 buyer and seller countries and years. 
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excludes	several	countries	 from	the	analysis.	 24	 In	addition,	 in	 the	case	of	France,	 there	 is	no	pre‐patent	box	data.	 In	Figures	4	and	5	we	show	the	simple	 trends	around	accession	 time	 for	all	 the	countries	in	our	dataset	that	have	introduced	a	patent	box	and	for	which	we	have	data	before	and	after	 its	 introduction.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 EP	 filings	 these	 countries	 are	 Belgium,	 Cyprus,	 Hungary,	Liechtenstein,	 Luxembourg,	 Malta,	 the	 Netherlands,	 Spain,	 and	 Switzerland.	 For	 R&D,	 we	 lose	Cyprus,	Malta,	and	Liechtenstein	due	to	lack	of	R&D	data.	Figures	B1‐B4	in	the	appendices	show	the	graphs	for	each	country.	
Figure	4	
	
																																																													24	The	patent	boxes	in	Portugal	and	the	UK	are	too	new,	and	for	France	and	Ireland	we	have	no	data	prior	to	the	box	introduction.		
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Figure	5	
	The	 two	 graphs	 are	 quite	 similar:	 both	 show	 a	 slow	 increase	 until	 the	 date	 of	 the	 patent	 box	introduction	and	then	the	curve	is	either	flat	or	declines	slightly.	Note,	however,	that	the	years	of	patent	box	introduction	cluster	around	2007	and	2008,	so	we	cannot	be	sure	that	the	flat	trend	is	not	 due	 to	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 great	 recession.	 To	 explore	 this,	 and	 also	 to	 control	 for	 country	differences,	we	estimate	some	simple	aggregate	patent	regressions	for	the	log	of	filings	by	inventors	in	 a	 country	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 patent	 box,	 the	 statutory	 corporate	 tax	 rate,	 the	population,	 real	 GDP,	 and	 a	 set	 of	 country	 and	 year	 dummies.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 patent	 filings	regression,	we	also	 include	the	R&D‐GDP	ratio	of	 the	country.	The	method	of	estimation	 for	both	sets	of	regressions	is	ordinary	least	squares,	because	most	country‐year	cells	have	a	large	number	of	counts	and	there	are	no	zeroes.		The	 estimation	 results	 are	 shown	 in	 Tables	 3	 and	 4.	 The	 first	 column	 in	 both	 regressions	 is	essentially	a	difference‐in‐difference	estimation	for	the	impact	of	the	patent	box,	as	the	regression	includes	only	the	patent	box	dummy	and	a	complete	set	of	country	and	year	dummies.	In	both	cases	the	coefficient	is	negative	and	either	insignificant	or	barely	significant.	The	remaining	columns	add	various	 country	 and	 tax	 variables	 to	 the	 regressions,	 and	 use	 the	 size	 of	 the	 patent	 tax	 wedge	instead	of	the	box	dummy.	Nothing	changes	the	basic	result,	however.	In	both	regressions,	the	two	patent	box	variables	are	insignificant	or	slightly	significant	but	with	the	wrong	sign:	if	anything,	the	presence	of	a	patent	box	reduces	patentable	invention	in	the	country.	Both	inventor	filings	and	R&D	depend	positively	on	GDP	per	capita,	and	inventor	filings	also	on	R&D	intensity.	As	mentioned	earlier,	Alstadsaeter	et	al.	 (2015)	 look	at	 the	change	 in	 the	number	of	 inventors	 in	host	 and	destination	 country	 in	 response	 to	 patent	 transfers	 at	 the	 company	 level,	 and	 find	 that	inventors	 in	 the	 destination	 country	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 increase	 when	 there	 is	 a	 further	
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development	requirement	for	the	use	of	a	patent	box	with	existing	patents	that	are	transferred.	We	probe	 this	 further	 in	 in	 columns	 4	 to	 6	 of	 Table	 3,	 which	 add	 the	 dummies	 for	 the	 inclusion	 of	existing	patents,	acquired	patents,	and	requirement	for	separate	development.	None	of	these	enter	significantly.	The	regression	is	also	at	the	edge	of	identifiability,	because	of	the	relatively	few	patent	box	observations,	especially	when	we	separate	them	into	those	with	development	restrictions.	So	we	conclude	that	our	results	are	inconsistent	with	those	of	Alstadsaeter	et	al.	(2015),	although	with	the	 caveat	 that	 standard	 errors	 are	 large.	 Another	 source	 of	 difference	 is	 that	 our	 estimates	 are	based	on	country	aggregates	and	those	of	Alstadsaeter	et	al.	on	large	R&D‐doing	firms	only,	most	of	which	are	multi‐nationals.		
Table	3	
		
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D (patent box) ‐0.21* ‐0.13*
  in all years after introduction (0.10) (0.06)
Patent tax rate wedge ‐0.49* ‐0.39 ‐0.05 ‐0.65*
  in all years after introduction (0.24) (0.58) (0.46) (0.29)
D (including existing patents)  ‐0.13
  * patent tax wedge (0.62)
D (including acquired patents)  ‐0.76
  * patent tax wedge (0.52)
D (development restriction)  0.32
  * patent tax wedge (0.52)
Corporate tax rate ‐1.45 ‐1.43 ‐1.42 ‐1.34 ‐1.38
(1.12) (1.14) (1.14) (1.14) (1.16)
Log population ‐0.97 ‐1.00 ‐1.01 ‐1.01 ‐0.95
(1.19) (1.21) (1.23) (1.20) (1.23)
Log GDP per capita 1.55*** 1.51*** 1.51*** 1.53*** 1.52***
(0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
Log R&D expenditure over GDP 0.70*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.72***
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Number of coefficients 53 57 57 58 58 58
R‐squared  0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Standard error 0.31 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Log‐likelihood ‐112.7 18.2 16.3 16.4 18.1 16.6
555 observations on 37 countries for the years  2000‐2014.
All  regressions  include a complete set of country and year dummies, as well  as  a dummy for missing R&D data 
(52 observations  on 4 small  countries).
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Method of estimation is  least squares  with robust standard errors, clustered by country
Inventor filings by country 
Dep. Var. = Log EP patent filings from inventors in the country
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Table	4	
	Our	 conclusion	 from	 this	 investigation	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 introducing	 a	 patent	 box	 on	 aggregate	innovative	 activity	 in	 a	 country	 is	 that	we	 cannot	 see	 any	 impact,	 at	 least	 at	 the	macroeconomic	level.				 	
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged log BERD 0.78***
(0.03)
Dummy for patent box ‐0.08
  in all years after introduction (0.04)
Dummy for  patent box 0.00
  in year of introduction (0.03)
Dummy for  patent box ‐0.04
  in year after introduction (0.04)
Dummy for  patent box ‐0.05
  two years after introduction (0.05)
Dummy for  patent box ‐0.03
  three years after introduction (0.04)
Patent tax rate wedge ‐0.41 ‐0.05
  in all years after introduction (0.22) (0.09)
Corporate tax rate ‐0.06 ‐0.09 ‐0.05 ‐0.23
(0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.14)
Log population ‐0.08 ‐0.06 ‐0.07 ‐0.11
(0.52) (0.57) (0.52) (0.13)
Log GDP per capita 1.60*** 1.60*** 1.59*** 0.46***
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.07)
Observations 503 503 503 469
R‐squared 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.999
Standard error 0.113 0.114 0.113 0.058
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
32 countries  2000‐2014. All  estimates  include country and year dummies. 
Country‐level Business R&D spending
Dep. Var. = Log BERD (Business enterprise R&D)
Method of estimation is  least squares  with robust standard errors, clustered by country.
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Patent	level	analysis	We	now	turn	to	an	analysis	of	the	choice	of	patents	to	transfer.	We	expect	that	the	patents	chosen	to	benefit	 from	reduced	 corporate	 taxes	will	 be	 those	 that	 generate	 greater	 income	 for	 their	owner	than	other	patents.	Data	on	the	income	generated	by	individual	patents	 is	not	available	to	us,	but	previous	work	has	 shown	 that	 several	measurable	 patent	 characteristics	 are	 associated	with	 the	economic	 value	 of	 patents	 (Harhoff	 et	 al.	 2003;	 Hall	 et	 al.	 2004).	 Therefore	we	 proxy	 for	 patent	value	 using	 some	 of	 these	 measures,	 as	 discussed	 below.	 We	 also	 expect	 that	 corporations,	especially	 multinational	 corporations,	 will	 be	 more	 likely	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 this	 kind	 of	 tax	planning.	In	what	follows,	we	will	distinguish	between	transfers	made	to	countries	with	lower	tax	rates	 for	 patent	 income	 and	 other	 international	 transfers,	 and	 between	 those	 made	 within	 a	corporate	 group	 (which	 are	 arguably	 more	 targeted	 towards	 tax	 benefits)	 and	 arm’s	 length	transactions	due	to	sale,	either	of	a	patent	portfolio,	or	of	the	entire	firm.	Our	 sample	 is	 the	 approximately	 2.5	million	 EP	 patents	 filed	 between	 1991	 and	 2014;	 of	 these	patents	 4.2	 percent	 were	 subject	 to	 an	 ownership	 transfer	 across	 countries	 between	 2000	 and	2014.	 25	We	 focus	 on	 the	 first	 time	 that	 the	 patent	 is	 transferred,	 and	drop	 the	 few	 cases	where	there	is	more	than	one	transfer.	Figure	5	shows	the	share	of	transfers	as	a	function	of	the	filing	date	of	 the	 patent,	 together	 with	 the	 number	 of	 EP	 patents	 transferred	 by	 transfer	 year.	 In	 the	subsequent	 analysis,	 we	 exclude	 transfers	 to	 and	 from	 tax	 havens.	 This	 restriction	 reduces	 the	number	of	transfers	from	100,936	to	91,351.	Due	to	the	large	size	of	the	sample,	and	the	low	probability	of	a	transfer	in	any	year	(about	0.3%),	we	 draw	 a	 random	10	 per	 cent	 sample	 of	 the	 non‐transferred	 patents	 for	 comparison.	 King	 and	Zeng	(2001),	among	others,	show	that	with	known	sampling	probability,	logit	coefficient	estimates	are	unaffected	by	this	procedure,	with	the	exception	of	the	intercept.	A	consistent	estimate	of	the	intercept	is	given	by	the	following:	
	 0 0 1ˆ log 1 y y               	 (7)	where	 0ˆ 		is	the	estimated	intercept,	ψ	is	the	population	share	of	transferred	patents,	and	 y 		is	the	share	of	the	transferred	patents	in	the	sample.	For	our	10	per	cent	sample,	this	correction	factor	is	equal	to	2.3.26	 	Note	that	for	rare	events,	the	correction	factor	is	approximately	equal	to	the	log	of	the	oversampling	probability	( y /	ψ).			
																																																													25	Of	course,	not	all	patent	applications	in	the	recent	years	that	will	eventually	be	granted	have	been	granted	by	April	2017,	the	date	of	our	PATSTAT	data.			26	Log	[((1‐.00317)/.00317)	(0.0309/(1‐0.0309))]	=	Log(315.5*.0317)	=	2.302 Log(10).	
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Figure	6	
	As	 discussed	 in	 Section	 4,	we	 chose	 to	 estimate	 a	 simple	 logit	model	 of	 the	 choice	 to	 transfer	 a	patent	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	 patent	 characteristics	 X	 and	 the	 patent	 owner	 characteristics	 Z.	 The	patent	characteristics	we	consider	are	those	that	are	familiar	from	the	literature	on	patent	value:	
 Patent	 family	 size	 (docdb	measure)	 –	 larger	 sizes	 are	 associated	both	with	 application	 in	multiple	 jurisdictions	 and	with	more	 complex	 continuation/divisional	 structures,	 used	by	firms	that	anticipate	value	from	the	application.	
 Number	 of	 claims	 –	 frequently	 positively	 associated	 with	 value,	 although	 results	 can	 be	ambiguous,	as	many	dependent	claims	may	also	represent	breadth	restrictions.	
 Number	of	 forward	 citations	 (5‐year)	 –	 the	number	of	 times	 the	patent	has	been	 cited	 in	subsequent	patent	filings	at	the	EPO	during	the	first	5	years	after	the	application.	
 Number	of	inventors	named	on	the	patent	–	a	larger	number	of	inventors	may	imply	greater	expense	devoted	to	the	invention,	in	expectation	of	a	greater	payoff.	Although	all	of	these	value	proxies	have	been	shown	to	be	correlated	with	the	underlying	value	of	the	 patented	 invention	 (Harhoff	 et	 al.	 2003),	 they	 vary	 in	 different	 ways,	 depending	 on	 the	technology,	type	of	owner,	and	specificity	of	the	invention.	For	example,	patent	family	size	is	likely	to	 be	 related	 both	 to	 the	 technology	 area	 (complex	 divisional	 structures	 are	 more	 likely	 in	pharmaceutical	 innovation)	 and	 to	 whether	 the	 patent	 owner	 operates	 in	multiple	 international	markets.	Like	Lanjouw	and	Schankerman	(2004),	we	use	factor	analysis	to	extract	the	first	common	factor	from	these	four	variables	and	use	that	as	our	indication	of	the	private	value	of	the	patented	invention.	 We	 first	 computed	 the	 residuals	 from	 a	 regression	 of	 each	 of	 the	 four	 variables	 on	application	year,	applicant	country,	and	a	set	of	34	technology	class	dummies	to	control	for	known	differences	 across	 time	 and	 space,	 and	 then	 extracted	 the	 first	 factor	 from	 an	 analysis	 of	 these	
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residuals.	We	 found	 that	 removing	 the	 dummy	 variable	 effects	 had	 little	 effect	 on	 the	 estimated	results	 from	using	 this	patent	value	proxy,	although	 it	did	 improve	 the	explanatory	power	of	our	regressions	slightly.	We	 have	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 patent	 owner	 characteristics	 Z,	 as	 they	 are	 entirely	 based	 on	 the	patent	data.		They	are	the	following:	
 The	 size	 of	 the	 applicant’s	 patent	 portfolio	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 current	 patent	 application,	which	reflects	the	saliency	of	patents	in	the	firm’s	strategy.	
 An	MNC	dummy	for	whether	 the	owner	 is	research	active	 in	more	than	two	countries	(as	indicated	by	patenting	from	that	country	at	least	once	during	the	entire	period).	
 A	dummy	for	whether	the	owner	is	a	corporation	(as	opposed	to	an	individual,	university,	non‐profit,	 or	 governmental	 entity).	 This	dummy	excludes	 the	MNC	dummy	above,	which	also	indicates	a	corporation.		All	 of	 these	 characteristics	 are	 non‐time‐varying.	 We	 also	 include	 dummies	 for	 the	 applicant	country,	 the	 technology	area	of	 the	patent	at	 the	34	area	 level,	and	 the	analysis	year	 in	all	of	 the	regressions..		Simple	statistics	for	these	variables	are	shown	in	Appendix	Table	C1.		Using	a	non‐parametric	rank	sum	test,	we	find	that	the	distribution	of	the	value‐related	variables	(family	size,	citations,	claims,	number	of	 inventors,	and	the	value	 indices)	 for	the	patents	that	are	transferred	 is	significantly	to	the	 right	 of	 that	 for	 patents	 that	 are	 not	 transferred.	 The	 transferred	 patents	 also	 have	 slightly	fewer	applicants	and	their	applicants	have	smaller	portfolios,	but	they	are	more	likely	to	belong	to	corporations	 that	 patent	 in	 multiple	 countries.	 Also	 note	 that	 because	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	independent	variables	is	quite	skew,	we	use	logarithms	of	the	variables	in	all	the	estimations	(with	the	exception	of	the	dummies).	Correlation	matrices	for	the	variables	are	shown	in	Appendix	Table	C2,	with	and	without	the	year,	country,	and	technology	means	removed.	These	correlations	are	not	especially	 large,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 that	 between	 the	 dummy	 for	 multinational	 patenting	corporations	 and	 cumulative	 patent	 holdings;	 controlling	 for	 year,	 country,	 and	 technology	 via	dummies	reduces	them	slightly.		Table	 5	 shows	 the	 result	 of	 estimating	 a	 logit	model	 for	 the	 probability	 of	 international	 transfer	using	equation	(6).	The	marginal	impact	on	the	probability	of	a	transfer	is	shown	in	the	last	column.	Keeping	 in	mind	that	the	sample	probability	of	a	 transfer	 is	0.033,	 the	effects	are	 fairly	 large.	For	the	most	part,	the	signs	of	the	coefficients	are	consistent	with	the	predictions	above	and	the	test	for	equality	 between	 the	 value	 coefficient	 and	 the	 negative	 of	 the	 tax	 rate‐value	 interaction	 easily	passes,	with	a	p‐value	of	0.804.	 	None	of	 the	predictors	of	 transfer	cost	matter.	However,	 the	 tax	rate	in	the	selling	country	has	a	strong	positive	impact	on	the	probability	of	a	transfer,	in	addition	to	the	 impact	 from	the	 interactions	with	patent	value.	 	We	display	the	distribution	of	 the	tax	rate	effect	with	respect	to	patent	value	in	Figure	7a	below.					
28		
Table	5	
	Figure	 7a	 shows	 the	 marginal	 effect	 of	 the	 seller’s	 tax	 rate	 on	 the	 probability	 of	 transfer	 as	 a	function	 of	 the	 patent	 value	 index,	 together	 with	 its	 95	 per	 cent	 confidence	 intervals	 and	 a	histogram	 of	 the	 patent	 value	 data.	 The	 figure	 shows	 that	 in	 the	 area	 of	 most	 of	 the	 data,	 the	estimated	impact	ranges	from	0.025	to	0.05	with	a	standard	error	of	about	0.01.	For	an	example,	at	the	mean	of	the	distribution	of	patent	quality,	the	impact	of	a	seller	tax	increase	of	20%	would	be	0.007	 =	 0.2*0.035,	which	 corresponds	 to	 an	 increase	 of	 the	 average	 transfer	 probability	 for	 our	over‐sampled	data	equal	to	0.7%.		Over	the	complete	population	of	EP	patents,	the	increase	would	be	 0.07%	 on	 an	 average	 transfer	 probability	 of	 0.34%,	 a	 semi‐elasticity	 of	 about	 0.2.	 From	 the	regression	 and	 the	 graph,	 one	 can	 also	 see	 that	 as	 the	 index	 of	 patent	 value	 grows,	 the	 tax	 rate	impact	falls,	as	a	smaller	tax	change	is	needed	to	induce	the	transfer	of	valuable	patents.		
Variable Mean (1) (2)
Marginals 
for (2)
Selling country tax rate * ‐0.00002 ‐0.265 ‐0.323* ‐0.0100*
   patent value index (0.196) (0.195) (0.0060)
Patent value index 0.00 0.341*** 0.359*** 0.0111***
(0.053) (0.054) (0.0170)
Selling country tax rate 0.323 1.137** 0.0352**
(0.469) (0.0146)
Log (cumulative patents) 5.25 0.023 0.023 0.0006
   for patent owner (0.031) (0.031) (0.0010)
Patent owner a multinational 0.614 0.118 0.118 0.0050
   research firm (0.092) (0.092) (0.0028)
Patent owner a corporation,  0.283 ‐0.034 ‐0.033 ‐0.0008
   not multinational (0.052) (0.052) (0.0016)
Log likelihood ‐381,438.8 ‐381,318.6
Chi‐squared 1,910.3 1,910.4
Degrees of freedom 88 89
R‐squared 0.052 0.053
2,800,073 patent‐year observations; 91,351 transfers
Heteroskedastic standard errors  clustered on 72,998 patent owners.
All  equations  include seller country, year, and tech dummies.
Logit model of the probability of a transfer
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Figure	7a:	Marginal	tax	rate	effect	
	Figure	7b	shows	a	similar	plot,	this	time	of	the	marginal	effect	of	patent	value	as	a	function	of	the	statutory	 tax	 rate	 on	 patent	 income.	 The	 histogram	 of	 the	 tax	 data	 makes	 it	 clear	 that	 the	observations	 are	 concentrated	 in	 a	 few	 cells,	 which	 are	 however	widely	 enough	 spread	 to	 yield	identification.	Over	the	populated	tax	rate	region	of	0.2	to	0.4,	the	marginal	effect	of	value	ranges	from	0.009	to	0.007.	At	the	mean	marginal	effect	of	0.008,	an	increase	in	the	value	index	from	‐1.0	to	1.0	would	imply	an	increased	likelihood	of	transfer	of	about	0.016	=	2*0.008.	This	translates	into	a	semi‐elasticity	of	about	50%	for	the	transfer	probability.		Although	 both	 these	 marginal	 effects	 have	 nontrivial	 standard	 errors,	 over	 the	 region	 of	 the	observed	data	they	are	clearly	significant	and	suggest	that	both	the	potential	seller’s	 tax	rate	and	the	value	of	a	patent	 influence	 the	probability	of	an	 international	 transfer.	The	results	also	 imply	that	there	is	a	tradeoff	between	tax	rates	and	value	in	the	relationship,	as	predicted	by	the	model	and	also	as	one	would	have	expected,	given	profit‐maximizing	firms	that	wish	to	avoid	taxation	of	those	profits.		
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Figure	7b:	Marginal	patent	value	effect	
		Table	6	explores	the	variation	across	the	different	types	of	transfers:	whether	they	are	potentially	tax‐motivated	 or	 not,	 whether	 they	 are	 within	 a	 corporate	 group	 or	 arm’s	 length.	 The	 first	 two	columns	 report	 the	 results	 of	 multinomial	 logit	 estimation	 with	 three	 possible	 choices	 for	 each	patent:	 no	 transfer	 (the	 left‐out	 category),	 transfer	 to	 a	 patent	 box	 country,	 and	 transfer	 to	 a	country	without	a	patent	box.	The	next	two	columns	report	a	similar	multinomial	logit	estimation	where	we	 distinguish	 between	 arms’	 length	 and	within	 group	 international	 patent	 transfers.	We	define	intra‐group	transfers	as	those	that	are	dependent	or	hierarchical	in	the	data	of	Gaessler	and	Harhoff	(2018).	The	no	transfer	choice	is	again	the	left‐out	category.	The	final	four	columns	report	results	 for	a	 five‐choice	multinomial	 logit	where	group	membership	has	been	 interacted	with	 the	patent	box.		Looking	first	at	the	standard	errors	on	the	tax	rate	variables,	we	note	that	they	are	very	large,	and	as	a	consequence	in	all	cases	we	easily	accept	the	constraint	that	the	coefficient	of	patent	value	and	the	 tax	 rate‐patent	 value	 interaction	 are	 equal	 and	 opposite,	 as	 implied	 by	 the	 simple	model	 (p‐values	all	much	larger	than	0.5).	But	there	is	simply	not	enough	variability	in	the	tax	rates	once	we	split	by	the	patent	box	for	any	strong	conclusions.	The	main	result	of	interest	is	that	multinationals	and	 other	 corporations	 are	more	 likely	 than	 other	 entities	 to	 transfer	 patents	 to	 a	 country	 that	introduces	a	patent	box,	as	one	would	expect.	 In	addition,	multinationals	are	much	more	likely	to	make	within‐group	transfers	in	response	to	the	patent	box,	and	also	in	response	to	higher	tax	rates	in	the	“selling”	country.		
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Table	6	
	Our	 first	 not	 very	 surprising	 conclusion	 from	 examining	 the	 patent	 level	 decision	 to	 transfer	ownership	internationally	is	that	more	valuable	patents	(with	value	measured	by	the	usual	proxies)	are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 transferred,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 the	 transfer	 is	 tax‐motivated	 or	 not.	Second,	 lower	taxes	in	the	selling	country	discourage	transfer,	but	at	a	diminishing	rate	as	patent	value	increases.	Third,	responsiveness	to	the	patent	box	is	much	higher	for	multinationals,	who	are	induced	by	its	presence	to	transfer	their	patents	to	group	members	in	the	patent	box	country.		
Dependent vaiable
Variable
Patent box 
country
Country 
without 
patent box
Not within 
a group
Within a 
group
Not a 
group, 
no pat box
Group, 
no pat box
Not a 
group, 
pat box
Group, 
pat box
Number of transfers  20,265 71,352 41,688 49,929 33,759 37,593 7,929 12,336
Selling country tax rate * ‐0.211 ‐0.468** ‐0.531*** ‐0.312 ‐0.559** ‐0.385 ‐0.345 ‐0.088
   patent value index (0.333) (0.208) (0.206) (0.301) (0.233) (0.319) (0.337) (0.500)
Patent value index 0.300*** 0.425*** 0.425*** 0.387*** 0.450*** 0.415*** 0.304*** 0.296*
(0.099) (0.056) (0.057) (0.081) (0.066) (0.081) (0.096) (0.153)
Selling country tax rate 0.333 0.823 0.666 1.051** 0.673 0.834 ‐0.615 0.918
(0.917) (0.503) (0.637) (0.512) (0.719) (0.618) (1.203) (1.327)
Log (cumulative patents) 0.040 0.011 ‐0.098*** 0.110** ‐0.113*** 0.118*** ‐0.035 0.083
   for patent owner (0.081) (0.026) (0.026) (0.047) (0.020) (0.041) (0.105) (0.108)
Patent owner a multi‐ 0.657*** 0.033 0.021 0.341** 0.019 0.103 0.058 1.193***
   national research firm (0.186) (0.093) (0.082) (0.156) (0.080) (0.166) (0.227) (0.261)
Patent owner a corp,  0.232** ‐0.08 0.012 ‐0.115 ‐0.016 ‐0.196* 0.169* 0.272*
   not multinational (0.097) (0.056) (0.038) (0.105) (0.042) (0.115) (0.101) (0.157)
Log likelihood
Chi‐squared
Degrees of freedom
R‐squared
2,727,759 patent‐year observations; 91,617 transfers
Heteroskedastic standard errors  clustered on 74,643 patent owners.
A complete set of country, year, and technology dummies  are included in the estimation.
176
0.066
Arms' length vs within 
group transfer
Sample is  all  granted EP patents  with fi l ing date between 1990 and 2014 that are transferred between 2000 and 2014 and a 10 per cent sample of 
patents not transferred.
‐419,587.4
8,529.6
176
0.066
‐472,233.9
18,113.7
352
Transfer to pat box/no 
pat box country Type of first International transfer of patent (1‐4)
In columns  1‐2, the two types are whether or not the transfer is  to a patent box country . In columns  3‐4 the two types  are whether or not the transfer 
is  within group. In columns  5‐8 the types  of transfer are defined by the interaction of the group membership dummy and whether or not the transfer 
is  to a patent box country.  The left‐out category is  always  no transfer.
All  right hand side variables  are in log form, with the exception of the multinational  and corporation dummies.
0.078
Multinomial Logit model of the probability of a transfer
‐433,406.1
3,629.5
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7. Conclusions	This	 paper	 reports	 on	 a	 comprehensive	 analysis	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 lower	corporate	 tax	 rate	 on	 patent‐related	 income	 in	 13	 European	 countries	 during	 the	 2000‐2014	period.	Although	 this	 change	 to	 the	 corporate	 tax	 systems	did	 seem	 to	 increase	 the	 international	transfer	 of	 patents	 into	 a	 jurisdiction,	 at	 least	 when	 there	 was	 no	 requirement	 for	 further	development	domestically,	we	 found	relatively	 little	 responsiveness	overall,	 although	we	did	 find	evidence	that	more	valuable	patents	are	those	transferred	and	that	multinationals	tended	to	move	patents	 across	 their	 group	 members	 in	 response	 to	 tax	 changes.	 However,	 neither	 patented	inventions	nor	R&D	investment	increased	in	the	countries	offering	a	patent	box.	These	last	results	are	important,	as	it	suggests	that	the	primary	stated	goal	of	introducing	a	patent	box	has	not	been	achieved.		Our	 literature	 review	revealed	a	wide	 range	of	 approaches	 to	estimating	 the	patent	box	effect	 as	well	 as	 somewhat	 inconclusive	 results.	 We	 found	 in	 our	 explorations	 that	 results	 had	 sizable	standard	errors	and	were	sensitive	to	specification,	especially	to	the	precise	definition	of	whether	acquired	or	existing	 IP	was	covered	by	the	box.	With	only	13	countries	 introducing	a	patent	box,	and	 allowing	 for	 both	 year	 and	 country	 effects,	 the	 number	 of	 actual	 degrees	 of	 freedom	 for	identification	is	rather	small.	Identification	is	achieved	by	comparing	the	change	in	a	country	before	and	after	patent	box	introduction	to	the	change	in	another	country	that	did	not	introduce	a	patent	box,	controlling	for	the	common	trend	in	the	two	countries.	It	is	challenging	then	to	distinguish	two	countries,	 one	 of	which	 has	 an	 existing	 patents	 exclusion,	 and	 the	 other	which	 does	 not.	 That	 is	probably	why	there	is	so	much	variation	in	the	results	of	the	prior	literature.		In	spite	of	this	extensive	caveat,	our	results	do	lead	to	one	conclusion	about	the	design	of	these	tax	instruments:	requiring	that	further	development	of	the	invention	take	place	within	the	country	in	order	to	benefit	from	the	lower	tax	rate	does	seem	to	mitigate	transfers	for	purely	tax	reasons.	This	provides	 support	 for	 the	 incorporation	 of	 such	 rules	 into	 the	 BEPS	 recommendations.	 In	 fact,	several	countries	have	already	modified	their	tax	rules	in	this	way.			Given	 the	 apparent	 effectiveness	of	R&D	 tax	 credits	 in	 increasing	 firm	spending	on	 research	 and	development	 reported	 in	 Hall	 and	 Van	 Reenen	 (2010)	 and	 Appelt	 et	 al.	 (2016),	 it	 is	 perhaps	surprising	that	countries	have	seen	the	necessity	 for	 the	 introduction	of	special	 tax	treatment	 for	income	derived	from	patented	 inventions.	 1	There	are	(at	 least)	 two	arguments:	 the	 first	(benign)	one	is	that	some	patented	inventions	are	produced	with	investment	other	than	R&D	but	still	have	features	 that	may	 create	 public	 goods	 in	 the	 form	of	 information,	 justifying	 a	 subsidy	 relative	 to	other	investments.	The	second	(less	benign)	one	 is	that	firms	with	commercially	valuable	patents	are	able	to	use	some	of	their	profits	for	rent‐seeking	in	the	form	of	a	reduced	tax	on	some	of	their	income.	Put	simply,	a	patent	box	subsidizes	output	rather	than	input,	so	it	benefits	mainly	firms	that	have	 had	 success	 with	 their	 invention.	 This	 may	 in	 turn	 be	 an	 encouragement	 to	 all	 firms	 to	undertake	such	invention,	but	it	seems	a	fairly	inefficient	way	to	do	so.																																																														1	Another	disadvantage	relative	to	R&D	incentives	is	that	such	an	instrument	does	almost	nothing	to	alleviate	the	ex	ante	liquidity	constraint	faced	by	innovating	firms	(Hall	and	Lerner	2010).	
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Appendix	A:	Literature	review	tables		
Table	A1:	Literature	on	corporate	taxation	and	patent	location		
	
	
	 	
Paper Data Level #Obs Years Obs/year
Dependent 
variable(s)
Independent variables Method
Dischinger & 
Riedel  (2011)
European MNEs  
with intang.
group 
member
6,223
1995‐
2005
566
intangible 
assets (D and 
log ratio to 
sales)
corp tax rate, tax diff btwn sub 
and parent, log sales, pop, R&D, 
GDP, growth in GDP per cap, 
corruption index, unemployment
logit FE; OLS FE; 
IV and GMM on 
first differences
Ernst & Spengel  
(2011)
EP apps; 
AMADEUS 
match
firm 80,484
1998‐
2007
8,048 EP patent fi l ings
corp tax, EATR, B‐index, GDP per 
cap, pubRD, Tertiary ed, GP 
index, Openness, Hi  tech exports, 
Emply, assets
logit FE ; neg bin 
FE
Karkinsky & 
Riedel  (2012)
EP apps; 
AMADEUS 
match; 18 EU 
countries
firm affi liate  64,061 1995‐
2003
7,118 EP patent fi l ings
corp tax rate, tax diff btwn sub 
and parent, royalty rate, CFC 
rules, R&D, GDP,corruption 
index, IP strength
OLS FE
Griffith, Miller 
& O'Connell  
(2014)
EP apps; 
AMADEUS 
match; 18 EU 
countries
patent 379,849
1985‐
2005
18,088
fil ing country 
choice
GDP, RD/GDP, inventor presence, 
tax rate, patent box rate, IP 
strength, industry‐location‐firm 
size dummies
random 
coefficient 
mixed logit
Boehm, 
Karkinsky, 
Knoll, & Riedel  
(2015)
EP apps  ‐ 
corporate; 
match to 
AMADEUS
patent 530,805
1978‐
2006
18,304
applicant/invent
or divergence at 
pat level
corp tax rate, pat quality, rule of 
law, corruption, GDP and GDP 
per cap; CFC; year country 
industry FE
probit FE
Dinkel  & Schanz 
(2015)
worldwide 
patstat ‐ MNEs  
matched to 
AMADEUS
group‐
country
62,717
2005‐
2012
7,840
D(pat abroad)
D (country)
N pats  in 
country
Tax attractiveness (corp tax rate, 
royalty rate, witholding roy rate, 
all  scaled); D(RD tax), D(transfer 
price), CFC, sales, GDP, RD per 
cap, distance, app‐reg, emp‐
inventors
probit FE (ind & 
year)
neg bin FE
Dudar, Spengel  
& Voget (2015)
royalty 
payments
country 
pairs
~20,000
1990‐
2012
~900
~60 
countries
royalty streams
royalty tax, tax difference, 
corporate tax, IP box dummies, 
CFC rules, TP rules, R&D, GDP, 
POP in recipient country, trade 
between
Poisson PML
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Table	A2:	Literature	on	patent	boxes	
	
Paper data level #obs years obs/year
dependent 
variable(s)
independent variables method pat box result
Alstadsaeter, 
Barrios, 
Nicodeme, 
Skonieczna and 
Vezzani  (2018)
EP apps; ORBIS 
data for EU 
scoreboard 
firms  in 33 
countries
firm‐
technology‐
industry
~160,000
2000‐
2011
4444? EP patent fi l ings
GDP, inventor presence, tax rate, 
patent box rate, triadic pats, IP 
strength, country dummies
random effects  
neg binomial; R 
coeff mixed logit
fi l ings  wrt box:  
‐5.0 (semi‐
elasticity)
Bösenberg & 
Egger (2017)
EP apps; 106 
countries
country‐
technology
639; 9425 1996‐
2012
49; 2600 fil ings  and 
transfers
B‐index, EATR, pat box dummy; 
researchers  per cap, GDP, avg pat 
characteristics
Poisson FE 
(year)
seller: 0.43***
buyer: 0.23***
Bradley, Duchy, 
and Robinson 
(2015)
worldwide 
patstat   countries 1,487
1990‐
2012
~70 
countries
inventor patent 
apps; owner 
patent apps; 
pats with inv 
country not 
owner country, 
etc
Patent box, pat box rate, other 
tax vars, GDP, population, patent 
system quality
Panel  OLS
domestic 
inventing 
increases if 
rate falls; no 
impact on 
mismatch 
owner‐inventor
Dudar, Spengel  
& Voget (2015)
royalty 
payments
country 
pairs
~20,000
1990‐
2012
~900
~60 
countries
royalty streams
royalty tax, tax difference, 
corporate tax, IP box dummies, 
CFC rules, TP rules, R&D, GDP, 
POP in recipient country, trade 
between
Poisson PML
Royalties  
increase i f IP 
box covering 
acquired and 
self‐generated 
patents
Koethenbuerger, 
Liberini  & 
Stimmelmayr 
(2016)
MNCs  from 
Orbis
subsidiaries
85,944 
(30,798 
matched)
2007‐
2013
12,715 
(4,498 
matched, 
2,942 
patenters)
stated profit 
before tax
D(patent box),(new pat entrant), 
and interactions; assets, leverage
diff‐in‐diff; ind‐
year, ctry‐year 
Fes
pat box used 
for profit 
shifting
Schwab & 
Todtenhaupt 
(2016)
MNCs  from 
Orbis/AMADEUS 
with sub in 
patent box 
country match 
to PAtSTAT
firm 271,251
2000‐
2012
20,865
worldwide pat 
grants
patent box, R&D/GDP, GDP per 
cap, corp tax, GDP growth R&D 
user cost. Real  interest rate, firm 
age, assets, work cap, capital  
intensity
Poisson FE (firm 
& year)
pat box in 
other countries  
has  positive 
spillovers  on 
domestic R&D
Ciaramella 
(2017)
EP apps firm 329,398 1997‐
2015
~16,000
patent transfers  
during the exam 
phase at the EPO
pat box, corp tax rate, CFC; log 
GDP, distance, language, RD/GDP Neg Bin FE (year)
buyer: 1.2***
seller: insig
Mohnen, Vankan 
& Verspagen 
(2017)
Dutch firm data firm 2007‐
2013
~15,000
R&D person‐
hours
use of patent box diff‐in‐diff
pat box 
positive for 
domestic R&D
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Appendix	B:	Simple	statistics	and	additional	estimates	for	aggregate	data	
Table	B1	
	
Code Country
R&E 
tax 
credit
@
CFC 
rules^
Years 
with 
patent 
box
Gross or net 
income
Includes 
existing 
patents
Includes 
acquired 
patents
Develop‐
ment 
condition
Patents 
transferred 
out 2000‐
2014
Patents 
transferred 
in 2000‐
2014
Diff‐
erence
AT Austria x 2521 1135 ‐1386
AU Australia x x 1202 587 ‐615
AW* Aruba 10 10
BB* Barbados 196 2269 2073
BE Belgium x 2007‐ gross  yes% yes% yes 1140 1639 498
BM* Bermuda 48 635 587
BS* Bahamas 29 157 128
CA Canada x x 3918 2172 ‐1745
CH Switzerland 2011‐ net yes yes no 6353 10521 4168
CL Chile x 13 43 30
CW* Curacao 85 628 542
CY Cyprus 2012‐ net yes yes no 139 197 58
CZ Czech Republic x 45 104 60
DE Germany x 13804 11633 ‐2171
DK Denmark x 1171 957 ‐214
EE Estonia x 10 20 10
ES Spain x x 2008‐ net yes no% yes 468 408 ‐61
FI Finland x 1466 3034 1567
FR France x x 1971‐ net yes yes# no 4821 5136 316
GB UK x x 2013‐ net yes yes% yes 12825 5792 ‐7032
GG* Guernsey 0 93 93
GI* Gilbraltar 12 86 74
GR Greece x 35 51 16
HK* Hong Kong 21 339 318
HU Hungary x x 2003‐ gross yes yes no 94 265 171
IE Ireland x 1973‐2010 yes no% yes 431 1695 1264
IL Israel x 930 1075 145
IM* Isle of Man 23 63 40
IS Iceland x x 27 155 128
IT Italy x x 1920 1281 ‐639
JE* Jersey 59 59
JP Japan x x 4626 2817 ‐1809
KR South Korea x x 686 816 130
KY* Cayman Islands 98 1587 1489
LI** Liechtenstein 2011‐ net no yes no 283 275 ‐8
LU Luxembourg 2008‐ net yes no no 500 2386 1886
MC* Monaco 66 50 ‐16
MT Malta 2010‐ not deduct. yes yes no 32 95 63
MX Mexico x 82 200 118
NL Netherlands x 2007‐ net no yes% yes 7826 11426 3600
NO Norway x x 466 867 401
NZ New Zealand x 182 107 ‐76
PL Poland 55 94 39
PT Portugal x x 2014‐ gross no no% yes 48 147 99
SE Sweden x x 3153 3948 795
SG* Singapore 186 1352 1167
SI Slovenia x 49 29 ‐20
SK Slovakia x 29 35 6
TR Turkey x 15 40 25
US US x x 28878 21081 ‐7797
VG* Virgin Islands (British) 87 1501 1414
Total 101091 101091 0
# if held for at least 2 years.    ^CFC rules in 2014.  % if further developed.
** GDP data not available from the Penn World Tables  for this country.
@Some kind of R&D tax credit (beyond expensing) available during the period.
Sources: Tax info ‐ Evers et al. (2013), Deloitte (2014), Alstadsæter et al. (2015).
Patent data ‐ authors'computations from Patstat April  2017.
* denotes countries that are tax havens; most do not have GDP data on PWT either.
Sample countries
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Table	B2	
		
Code Country
Years with 
IP box
R&E tax 
credit@
Includes 
existing 
patents
Includes 
acquired 
patents
Corp tax 
rate 
(statutory)
IP box rate 
(statutory)
Effective 
average tax 
rate ord. 
income
Effective 
average tax 
rate IP box
BE Belgium 2007‐ x yes% yes% 34 6.8 21.11 ‐26.95
CY Cyprus 2012‐ yes yes 10 2.5 11.69 2.34
FR France 1971‐ x yes yes# 34 16 26.56 ‐6.41
HU Hungary 2003‐ x yes yes 20 10 14.25 ‐2.54
IE Ireland 1973‐2010 x yes no% 12.5 0 12.50 0.00
LI** Liechtenstein 2011‐ no yes 12.5 2.5 6.92 1.39
LU Luxembourg 2008‐ yes no 29 5.84 21.92 5.47
MT Malta 2010‐ yes yes 35 0 26.25 0.00
NL Netherlands 2007‐ x no yes% 25.5 5 18.75 3.75
PT Portugal 2014‐ x no no% 31.5 15 31.50 15.00
ES Spain 2008‐ x yes no% 30 12 22.50 ‐2.95
CH Switzerland 2011‐ yes yes 21 8.8 9.50 2.74
GB UK 2013‐ x yes yes% 22 10 15.75 7.50
# i f held for at least 2 years.
% if further developed.
** GDP data not available from the Penn World Tables  for this  country.
@Some kind of R&D tax credit (beyond expensing) available during the period.
Effective average tax rates for countries with a Patent Box
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Table	B3	
	
All All All
Within 
group
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Buyer corporate tax rate 0.54 0.71 0.96 0.17
(1.26) (1.25) (1.32) (1.81)
Dummy for buyer patent box ‐0.05
  in all years after introduction (0.15)
Buyer patent tax rate wedge 0.08
  in all years after introduction (0.75)
Dummy for buyer patent box 0.00 0.01
  in year of introduction (0.11) (0.15)
Dummy for buyer patent box 0.15 0.26
  in year after introduction (0.23) (0.26)
Dummy for buyer patent box 0.38 0.60**
  two years after introduction (0.23) (0.26)
Dummy for buyer patent box ‐0.11 ‐0.21
  three years after introduction (0.14) (0.20)
Seller corporate tax rate 0.57 0.70 1.00 1.42
(1.14) (1.12) (1.11) (1.40)
Dummy for seller patent box ‐0.29**
  in all years after introduction (0.13)
Seller patent tax rate wedge ‐1.40**
  in all years after introduction (0.65)
Dummy for seller patent box 0.02 0.17
  in year of introduction (0.21) (0.25)
Dummy for seller patent box ‐0.30* ‐0.20
  in year after introduction (0.17) (0.20)
Dummy for seller patent box ‐0.19 ‐0.22
  two years after introduction (0.13) (0.20)
Dummy for seller patent box ‐0.12 ‐0.03
  three years after introduction (0.18) (0.23)
Chi‐squared 10166.2 10171.0 9754.7 7866.8
Chi‐sq degrees of freedom 119 119 125 125
Estimates including 14 tax haven countries
Dependent variable: Number of patents transferred from seller country to buyer 
country  during the year
Inter‐country patent transfer flows
Poisson random effects  panel  regression with standard errors clustered on buyer‐seller 
country pairs. 
36,750 observations  on 2,450 country pairs, 2000‐2014
Coefficient significance is denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
All  regressions include complete sets  of dummies  for the 37 buyer and seller countries and 
years. 
42		
Table	B4	
	
Variable
All
(1)
All
(2)
All
(3)
Within 
group
(4)
Difference:  0.03 0.18 ‐0.34 0.31
   seller corp tax‐buyer corp tax (0.85) (0.87) (0.94) (1.23)
Difference:  0.63 1.35** 0.36 0.48
   buyer‐seller patent tax wedge (0.49) (0.61) (0.55) (0.73)
D (dev condition on use)*buyer‐ ‐1.91*
   seller patent tax wedge (1.03)
D (CFC rules apply to buyer) ‐0.23 ‐0.12
(0.19) (0.25)
D (CFC) * seller‐buyer corp 2.04 0.29
   tax difference (1.29) (1.53)
D (CFC) * buyer‐seller patent  1.29 2.14*
   box difference (1.02) (1.23)
Chi‐squared 10060.2 10027.8 9661.6 7304.0
Degrees of freedom 117 118 120 120
Inter‐country patent transfer flows ‐ exploring tax variables
Estimates including 14 tax haven countries
Dependent variable: Number of patents transferred from seller country to buyer 
country  during the year
Poisson random effects  panel  regression with standard errors clustered on buyer‐seller country 
pairs. 
36,750 observations  on 2,450 country pairs, 2000‐2014
Coefficient significance is  denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
All  regressions include complete sets  of dummies  for the 51 buyer and seller countries  and years. 
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Table	B5	
	
Variable
All
(1)
All
(2)
All
(3)
All
(4)
All
(5)
Within 
group
(6)
Within 
group
(7)
Difference:  0.18 0.05 0.16 0.35 ‐0.31 0.70 0.29
   seller corp tax‐buyer corp tax (0.88) (0.87) (0.88) (0.90) (0.95) (1.12) (1.24)
Difference:  0.60 0.96* 0.65 1.35** 0.33 1.82** 0.40
   buyer‐seller patent tax wedge (0.49) (0.50) (0.54) (0.63) (0.55) (0.85) (0.74)
D (existing patents) * buyer‐ ‐1.40
   seller patent tax wedge (1.08)
D (acqired patents) * buyer‐ ‐0.24
   seller patent tax wedge (1.10)
D (dev condition on use)*buyer‐ ‐1.95* ‐2.29*
   seller patent tax wedge (1.03) (1.30)
D (CFC rules apply to buyer) ‐0.37** ‐0.22
(0.17) (0.27)
D (CFC) * seller‐buyer corp 3.31*** 1.20
   tax difference (1.13) (1.77)
D (CFC) * buyer‐seller patent  1.27 2.22*
   box difference (1.04) (1.26)
Chi‐squared 4054.3 4131.0 4097.4 4072.5 4175.9 3183.1 3095.2
Degrees of freedom 90 91 91 91 93 91 93
All  regressions  include complete sets  of dummies for the 37 buyer and seller countries and years. 
19,980 observations  on 1,332 country pairs, 2000‐2014
Poisson random effects  panel  regression with standard errors  clustered on buyer‐seller country pairs. 
Dependent variable: Number of patents transferred from seller country to buyer country  during the year
Inter‐country patent transfer flows ‐ exploring tax variables
Coefficient significance is  denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure	B1	
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Appendix	C:	Patent	and	applicant	level	data	on	transfers	Our	analysis	sample	of	(first)	 international	patent	transfers	consists	of	91,617	patents	applied	for	between	1991	and	2014,	and	transferred	between	2000	and	2014.‐‐‐%	of	these	transfers	were	to	countries	with	a	patent	box	in	effect.	Patents	are	transferred	internationally	at	all	ages,	but	a	large	number	are	transferred	two	years	after	the	year	of	application,	which	coincides	with	the	most	likely	year	of	grant	date	(Figure	C1).		
Figure	C1	
	This	is	confirmed	by	Figure	C2,	which	shows	the	distribution	of	the	age	at	transfer	relative	to	the	grant	date	for	the	61%	of	the	patents	that	have	been	granted,	separately	for	arm’s	length	transfers	and	 those	within	group	 (i.e.,	within	a	multinational).	 For	within	group	 transfers,	 a	 large	majority	take	place	before	 the	grant	(78%).	Although	the	majority	of	 the	other	 transfers	also	occur	before	grant	(56%),	they	have	a	secondary	peak	two	years	after	grant.	In	addition,	all	the	transfers	for	the	patents	 not	 yet	 granted	 take	 place	 before	 grant,	 perforce.	We	 also	 examined	 the	 distribution	 of	transfer	age	relative	to	grant	for	transfers	to	countries	with	and	without	a	patent	box	at	the	time	of	transfer.	These	look	very	similar	(not	shown).		
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Figure	C2	
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Table	C1	
	
Variable Mean# St.dev. Median IQ range Min Max
Family size 8.191 0.573 8 1.83 2 236
Number of claims 14.546 0.551 15 1.82 1 593
5‐year forward cites 2.313 0.822 2 4.00 1 142
Number of inventors 3.346 0.438 3 2.50 1 63
Value index 0.189 0.663 0.11 0.86 ‐1.72 4.25
Value index (dummies removed)% 0.145 0.615 0.08 0.79 ‐2.13 3.88
Number of applicants 2.016 0.062 2 1.00 2 10
Cumulative applicant patents* 166.3 2.974 158.0 209.00 2 39,584
MNC (multi‐country researcher) 0.655 0.475 1 1 0 1
Corporation, not MNC 0.251 0.434 0 1 0 1
Individual 0.077 0.267 0 0 0 1
Government or non‐profit 0.017 0.128 0 0 0 1
Family size 6.570 0.555 6 1.80 2 428
Number of claims 12.700 0.657 14 1.80 1 396
5‐year forward cites 1.934 0.757 2 3.00 1 972
Number of inventors 3.254 0.444 3 2.00 1 55
Value index ‐0.061 0.654 ‐0.14 0.83 ‐2.03 4.72
Value index (dummies removed)% ‐0.044 0.598 ‐0.11 0.76 ‐2.18 4.88
Number of applicants 2.023 0.074 2 1.00 2 21
Cumulative applicant patents* 168.5 0.741 199.0 140.54 2 41,459
MNC (multi‐country researcher) 0.612 0.487 1 1 0 1
Corporation, not MNC 0.292 0.455 0 1 0 1
Individual 0.050 0.219 0 0 0 1
Government or non‐profit 0.045 0.208 0 0 0 1
Diff s.e. T‐stat
Family size 0.096 0.002 43.4
Number of claims 0.059 0.002 26.0
5‐year forward cites 0.078 0.003 24.8
Number of inventors 0.012 0.002 7.1
Value index 0.250 0.003 97.4
Value index (dummies removed)% 0.189 0.002 79.7
Number of applicants ‐0.002 0.000 ‐6.5
Cumulative applicant patents ‐0.006 0.010 ‐0.6
MNC (multi‐country researcher) 0.042 0.002 22.8
Corporation, not MNC ‐0.041 0.002 ‐24.0
Individual 0.027 0.001 27.3
Government or non‐profit ‐0.029 0.001 ‐47.4
@ 10 per cent sample of non‐transferred patents.
The ranksum tests  whether the distribution of the variable for the transferred patents is to the right of that for non‐
transferred patents.
EPO patents applied for 2000‐2014: Simple statistics
58.7
18.4
‐16.9
25.4
Ranksum test ‐ chisq(1)
104.6
45.9
* Cumulative patent applications  by patent owner in the year 2000 or the year of patent fi l ing, whichever is later.
Internationally transferred patents (N=91,617)
Patents that are not internationally transferred (N=237,100)@
‐40.4
‐2.2
Difference in means#
‐26.2
% This index is  based on the first four variables with applicant year and country, and technology class  means  
removed.
100.2
81.3
27.8
# The geometric mean is shown for all  variables except the four sector dummies; the t‐test is conducted on the log 
means for these variables.
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Table	C2	
	
Table	C3	
	
Family size 1.000
Number of claims 0.092 1.000
5‐year forward cites 0.353 0.188 1.000
Number of inventors 0.168 0.088 0.171 1.000
Number of applicants ‐0.001 0.003 0.006 0.114 1.000
Cumulative applicant patents ‐0.001 ‐0.050 0.024 0.097 ‐0.050 1.000
MNC (multi‐country researcher) 0.058 ‐0.018 0.053 0.148 ‐0.103 0.513 1.000
Corporation, not MNC ‐0.042 0.002 ‐0.039 ‐0.107 ‐0.038 ‐0.423 ‐0.790 1.000
Individual ‐0.040 0.004 ‐0.047 ‐0.158 0.181 ‐0.205 ‐0.332 ‐0.161 1.000
Government or non‐profit 0.003 0.037 0.017 0.073 0.114 ‐0.051 ‐0.262 ‐0.127 ‐0.053 1.000
Family size 1.000
Number of claims 0.037 1.000
5‐year forward cites 0.307 0.149 1.000
Number of inventors 0.112 0.062 0.130 1.000
Number of applicants ‐0.012 0.005 0.004 0.109 1.000
Cumulative applicant patents 0.020 ‐0.038 0.018 0.081 ‐0.039 1.000
MNC (multi‐country researcher) 0.066 ‐0.020 0.039 0.121 ‐0.089 0.461 1.000
Corporation, not MNC ‐0.029 0.010 ‐0.017 ‐0.071 ‐0.047 ‐0.391 ‐0.780 1.000
Individual ‐0.036 0.007 ‐0.034 ‐0.130 0.179 ‐0.153 ‐0.286 ‐0.221 1.000
Government or non‐profit ‐0.045 0.015 ‐0.011 0.036 0.096 ‐0.022 ‐0.257 ‐0.138 ‐0.060 1.000
All  variables  are in logs  except the four sector dummies
# Sample is  based on a 10 per cent sample of the non‐transferred patents  and all  of the transferred patents.
All EPO patents applied for 2000‐2014: 328,717 observations#
Correlation matrix
Correlation matrix with year, tech, country dummies removed
no 
transfer@
non‐group, 
non‐tax
group,
non‐tax
non‐group, 
tax‐related
group, 
tax‐related
Observations 237,100 33,759 37,593 7,929 12,336
Family size 6.57 8.09 8.43 8.01 8.04
Number of claims 12.70 14.64 14.77 14.06 13.90
5‐year forward cites 1.93 2.27 2.37 2.26 2.28
Value index ‐0.06 0.15 0.24 0.16 0.17
Value index (dummies removed)% ‐0.04 0.13 0.17 0.09 0.14
Number of inventors 3.25 3.19 3.48 3.36 3.40
Number of applicants 2.02 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.03
Cumulative applicant patents* 11.2 6.8 18.0 10.6 17.1
MNC (multi‐country researcher) 0.61 0.52 0.74 0.58 0.82
Corporation, not MNC 0.29 0.36 0.17 0.33 0.14
Individual 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.03
Government or non‐profit 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01
Variable means by type of transfer#
# The geometric mean is  shown for all  variables  except the four sector dummies
* Cumulative patent applications  by patent owner in the year 2000 or the year of application, whichever is  later.
@ 10 per cent sample of non‐transferred patents.
% This  index is  based on the first four variables  with applicant year and country, and technology class  means  
removed.
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Appendix	D:	Modelling	international	patent	transfer	
Overview	Estimation	 of	 a	model	 of	 international	 patent	 transfer	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	patent	 (X),	 the	 current	 country	 (Z),	 and	 the	 potential	 countries	 to	 which	 the	 patent	 might	 be	transferred	(W)	proved	difficult,	probably	because	we	have	limited	variability	in	the	tax	variables,	especially	 those	 for	 the	patent	box.	The	body	of	 the	paper	presents	 simple	 logit	 and	multinomial	logit	 estimates,	 with	 standard	 errors	 clustered	 at	 patent	 owner	 level.	 This	 approach	 allows	correlation	 across	 time	 and	 patents	 owned	 by	 a	 single	 entity,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 identify	 effects	associated	with	the	characteristics	W	of	the	countries	to	which	a	patent	might	be	transferred,	with	the	exception	of	identifying	those	with	a	patent	box.		We	attempted	to	estimate	a	number	of	other	econometric	models	as	described	in	the	following:	1. A	 hazard	 rate	 model	 of	 transfer	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	 patent	 characteristics	 X,	 seller	characteristics	Z,	 and	possibly	 interactions	of	X	with	W.	This	kind	of	model	allows	 for	 the	absorbing	nature	of	the	first	transfer.	In	principle,	transfer	to	a	patent	box	country	versus	a	non‐patent	box	country	could	be	explored	using	a	competing	risks	hazard	model,	but	 this	proved	impossible	due	to	lack	of	convergence.	2. A	multinomial	probit	model	similar	to	the	multinomial	logit	models	in	the	text,	which	would	allow	for	correlation	among	the	alternatives.		3. A	multinomial	logit	model	of	choice	with	random	coefficients	on	the	case	variables.2		With	a	 suitable	 assumption	on	 the	distribution	of	ε,	 the	model	 in	 the	 text	will	 generate	 a	hazard	function	 for	 the	 transfer	 from	 country	 s	 to	 country	 b.	 Alternatively,	 given	 its	 equivalence	 to	 a	random	utility	model,	it	will	generate	a	multinomial	logit	or	nested	logit	model	under	the	extreme	value	assumption.	Transfer	is	more	likely	under	the	following	conditions:		1. The	 difference	 between	 the	 tax	 rates	 applying	 to	 patent	 income	 in	 the	 two	 countries	 is	larger.	For	most	countries	and	years,	this	is	the	corporate	tax	rate,	while	for	countries	that	have	introduced	a	patent	box,	it	will	be	the	patent	box	rate.	For	the	government/non‐profit	sector,	the	rate	will	be	zero.		2. The	 value	 of	 the	 patent	 in	 generating	 tax‐relevant	 income	 is	 higher.	 That	 is,	 the	 value	indicators	X	are	larger.	3. The	cost	of	making	the	transfer	is	lower,	which	we	proxy	using	the	dummies	for	the	type	of	patenting	entity	and	its	cumulative	patent	holdings.	All	of	these	are	measurable	for	the	patents	that	are	actually	transferred.		However,	a	major	problem	for	hazard	rate	or	simple	logit	estimation	is	that	the	potential	tax	rates	in	 the	 buyer	 country	 are	 unobserved	 if	we	 do	 not	 observe	 a	 transfer.	 To	 ameliorate	 rather	 than	actually	solve	this	problem,	we	computed	average	tax	rates	of	patent	income	in	each	year	across	the	countries,	excluding	the	country	in	which	the	patent	 is	resident.	The	difference	in	tax	rates	 in	the	equation	 above	 was	 then	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 tax	 rate	 faced	 by	 patent	 income	 in	 the	potential	selling	country	less	the	average	tax	rates	across	the	potential	buying	countries.	In	the	case																																																														2	Fixed	coefficients	would	result	in	as	many	coefficients	as	choices	for	each	case	variable,	and	is	unlikely	to	be	identified.	
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of	an	actual	transfer,	we	used	the	observed	tax	rate	in	the	buying	country	instead,	so	as	not	to	lose	too	much	precision	in	our	estimates.	This	estimation	strategy	was	unsuccessful,	as	one	might	have	expected.		If	we	believe	that	the	country	of	patent	ownership	affects	the	profits	available	from	a	patent	in	ways	other	than	the	tax	rate	faced	by	those	profits,	we	can	complicate	the	model	as	follows:		
(1 )( )its ts i s itX Z        	From	 this	 equation	 it	 is	worth	 observing	 that	 case	 variables	 (those	 that	 are	 associated	with	 the	patent	and	its	original	location/owner)	are	those	indexed	by	i,	j,	and	s.	Such	variables	are	identified	in	 the	 simple	 logit	 or	 hazard	 rate	models.	 Alternative‐specific	 variables	 are	 those	 indexed	 by	 b,	possibly	in	product	with	case	variables.	These	are	not	identified	unless	multinomial	logit	(possibly	nested)	or	multinomial	probit	with	many	alternatives	are	used.		The	following	case	variables	are	suggested	by	the	model:	
 Patent	quality	measures,	interacted	with	the	patent	tax	rate	of	the	seller.	
 Characteristics	of	the	selling	country,	interacted	with	the	patent	tax	rate	of	the	seller.	
 Characteristics	of	the	patent	owner.	It	 is	possible	 that	one	also	might	want	 to	add	the	non‐interacted	variables,	and	the	 interaction	of	taxes	with	 the	patent	owner	characteristics.	 It	 is	also	possible	 to	 include	dummies	 for	 the	selling	country,	and	for	the	transfer	years.	For	the	tax	rate,	the	sensible	variable	to	use	is	the	nominal	tax	rate	faced	by	patent	income	(which	may	be	nothing	like	the	actual	tax	rate	faced	by	an	individual	entity,	but	we	do	not	have	the	information	to	compute	that).	The	tax	rate	we	use	is	the	corporate	tax	rate	in	the	case	of	no	patent	box,	or	the	patent	box	rate.	The	alternative‐specific	variables	are	the	following:	
 Patent	quality	measures,	interacted	with	the	patent	tax	rate	of	the	buyer.	
 Characteristics	of	the	buying	country,	interacted	with	the	patent	tax	rate	of	the	buyer.	Again,	it	might	be	useful	to	add	the	non‐interacted	variables.	And	note	that	these	variables	are	not	available	 in	 the	case	of	no	transfer.	 It	 is	also	possible	to	 include	dummies	for	the	buying	country,	although	identification	may	be	difficult.		In	what	 follows	we	present	 a	 set	 of	 hazard	estimates	 corresponding	 to	 the	 logit	 estimates	 in	 the	body	of	the	paper.3	For	simplicity,	we	measure	patent	value	as	the	first	principal	component	of	the	set	of	4	value	indicator	variables	(forward	cites,	claims,	family	size,	and	number	of	inventors).	All	these	 variables	 have	 positive	 loadings	 on	 the	 first	 component,	 and	 we	 know	 that	 they	measure	slightly	different	things,	so	it	makes	sense	to	use	some	kind	of	common	aggregate.		
																																																													3	The	multinomial	probit	models	and	random	coefficient	logit	models	did	not	converge,	which	is	most	likely	due	to	insufficient	variation	in	the	data	on	patent	boxes.	
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Hazard	rate	estimation	The	 natural	 way	 to	model	 the	 decision	 to	 transfer	 a	 patent	 internationally	 is	 with	 a	 survival	 or	hazard	 rate	model.4	 Because	 the	 regressors	we	will	 use	 in	 our	 initial	 analysis	 are	 constant	 over	time,	 the	results	 from	a	hazard	rate	model	will	be	similar	 to	 those	 from	a	 logit	probability	model	with	standard	errors	clustered	across	time,	as	was	presented	in	the	text.	In	the	case	of	the	Weibull	model	with	covariates	that	do	not	vary	over	time,	the	estimates	will	be	identical	(Lancaster	1990,	p.	104).	 We	 present	 estimates	 based	 on	 a	 proportional	 hazard	 model	 here;	 the	 equivalent	 logit	estimates	from	the	body	of	the	paper	are	shown	for	comparison.		We	 model	 the	 decision	 to	 transfer	 a	 patent	 using	 proportional	 hazard	 rate	 models,	 where	 the	hazard	of	patent	i’s	transfer	at	time	t	is	given	by	the	following:	
( , ) Pr(  transferred at |  not yet transferred, )
( )exp( )
i i
i
h X t i t i X
h t X b
º
= ,	where	 i	 denotes	 a	 patent	 and	 t	 denotes	 the	 time	 since	 the	 patent’s	 application	 date.	 h(t)	 is	 the	baseline	hazard,	which	is	either	a	non‐parametric	or	a	parametric	function	of	time	since	entry	into	the	sample.	The	impact	of	any	characteristic	x	on	the	hazard	can	be	computed	as	follows:	
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b b b¶ ¶= =¶ ¶ 	Thus	if	x	is	measured	in	logs,	β	measures	the	elasticity	of	the	hazard	rate	with	respect	to	x.	Note	that	this	quantity	does	not	depend	on	the	baseline	hazard	h(t),	but	is	the	same	for	any	t.		Figure	D1	shows	the	Kaplan‐Meier	estimate	of	the	cumulative	hazard	of	an	international	transfer	as	a	function	of	patent	age.	The	curve	is	smooth	and	shows	the	large	jump	between	ages	1	and	2	that	we	also	observed	in	Figure	C1.	We	estimated	a	number	of	proportional	hazard	models,	all	of	which	were	able	to	reproduce	this	curve	easily	(not	shown).	We	use	the	Cox	proportional	hazard	model	here,	as	it	is	the	most	flexible,	and	best	accommodates	the	jump	in	the	data	at	age	1	to	2.		
																																																													4	As	 indicated	above,	 ideally	one	would	model	 the	decision	to	transfer	a	patent	to	a	particular	country	as	a	function	 of	 that	 country’s	 characteristics	 as	well	 as	 the	 patent	 characteristics,	 using	 a	 random	 coefficients	logit	model	as	in	Griffith	et	al.	(2004),	or	perhaps	a	competing	risks	model.	However,	we	found	that	there	was	insufficient	variability	across	countries	in	the	patent	box	to	obtain	meaningful	estimates	using	these	methods.	
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Figure	D1	
Cumulative hazard of an international transfer for EP patents 
	Table	D1	presents	the	results	of	Cox	proportional	hazard	estimation	of	the	same	model	as	the	logit	estimation,	which	is	shown	for	comparison.	Note	that	because	hazard	rate	estimation	requires	that	all	 observations	 begin	 at	 least	 with	 the	 period	 before	 the	 transfer,	 the	 sample	 sizes	 are	 slightly	different	 from	 the	 logit	 model	 in	 the	 text	 (where	 a	 transfer	 is	 allowed	 in	 the	 first	 period).	 The	estimates	are	still	very	similar	to	the	logit	estimates,	as	they	should	be.		
Table	D1	
	
Variable Mean (1) (2) (3) (4)
Selling country tax rate * ‐0.00005 ‐0.240 ‐0.309* ‐0.208 ‐0.272
   patent value index (0.184) (0.183) (0.199) (0.198)
Patent value index 0.000 0.304*** 0.326*** 0.325*** 0.345***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.054) (0.055)
Selling country tax rate 0.325 1.249*** 1.313***
(0.430) (0.462)
Log (cumulative patents) 5.25 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.025
   for patent owner (0.027) (0.027) (0.032) (0.032)
Patent owner a multinational 0.614 0.063 0.062 0.124 0.123
   research firm (0.081) (0.081) (0.096) (0.095)
Patent owner a corporation,  0.284 ‐0.042 ‐0.041 ‐0.040 ‐0.040
   not multinational (0.048) (0.048) (0.054) (0.054)
Log likelihood ‐1,094,370.4 ‐1,094,215.9 ‐371,866.7 ‐371,708.1
Chi‐squared 1,920.1 1,914.7 1,813.3 1,825.5
Degrees of freedom 88 89 88 89
R‐squared 0.016 0.016 0.057 0.057
2,559,430 patent‐year observations  for 2001‐2014; 91,351 transfers
Heteroskedastic standard errors clustered on 72,998 patent owners.
All  equations include seller country, year, and tech dummies.
Method of estimation is  Cox proportional  hazard in columns 1 and 2 and Logit in columns 3 and 4.
Cox PH
Cox PH and Logit models of the probability of an international transfer
Logit
